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Part I of this article presents an overview of the physicalfeatures
and resources of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Next, the
article explains the history of the diverse claims and interests in
Antarctic territory, with particularemphasis on the United States'
activities. Aspects of the Antarctic Treaty regime are then explored, especially management of living resources and potential
exploration and exploitation of hydrocarbon and mineral resources. The article points out past weaknesses in United States'
Antarctic policymaking. Recommendations include a broader role
for the Department of Defense in areas such as safety and security, and resolution among Antarctic Treaty parties of jurisdiction
over criminal offenses committed in Antarctica. The model suggested is transposed from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Status of Forces Agreement. Finally, the article examines
the recent influence of the United Nations over Antarctic affairs,
and proposes increased cooperation between the governing
Antarctic Treaty consultative parties and the United Nations to
avoid confrontation over the impending minerals regime.
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I. *INTRODUCTION

The "Question of Antarctica"' is one the community of nations
chose to ignore until the mid-1980s. When the United Nations Con-

vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 2 was negotiating a regime to govern the world's ocean space, it left untouched the concomitant problems posed by Antarctica and its surrounding
Southern Ocean. This omission occurred partly because including
those issues would have heightened the likelihood of a failure to
reach consensus regarding ocean space in general, and partly because of a lack of a sense of immediacy about resolving Antarctic

issues.
To date, Antarctica has been effectively administered by the consultative parties of the Antarctic Treaty system, which was initiated
by the United States.' That regime is tacitly recognized by the international community as the legitimate administrative power in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean for environmental and ecosystem
protection purposes and for international cooperation in scientific research.' However, with the advent of a minerals regime for exploitation of the region's nonliving resources, the outside world, and particularly the United Nations, is showing increasing interest in
participating in Antarctic affairs.

1. The United Nations refers to issues concerning Antarctica collectively as the
"Question of Antarctica." See infra notes 164, 168 and accompanying text.
2. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, done Dec. 10, 1982, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.62/122, reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
3. See infra notes 79, 128-30 and accompanying text.
4. For a state to effectively protest a disputed action, it must take "all necessary
and reasonable steps to prosecute the available means of redressing the infringement of
its rights." Fisheries (U.K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116 (Judgment of Dec. 18) [hereinafter
Anglo Norwegian Fisheries]. There has been no effective protest by states or international organizations against the legitimacy of the Antarctic Treaty System. See supra
text accompanying notes 1, 2; infra note 16. Even in its resolutions on the "Question of
Antarctica," the United Nations General Assembly has never challenged the administrative authority of the Antarctic Treaty System regime. See infra text accompanying notes
166-68. This absence of effective state protest of the status quo may constitute acquiescence or estoppel, thereby legitimizing the current governing system under customary
international law. See generally MacGibbon, Some Observations on the Part of Protest
in InternationalLaw, 30 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 297 (1953). Protest by the United Nations
General Assembly of the Antarctic Treaty regime's impending minerals regime, however,
may prevent customary international law from legitimizing that activity. See infra notes
165, 170 and accompanying text.

II.

CONTINENTAL AND OCEANIC FEATURES AND RESOURCES

Antarctica is unique among the seven continents in many respects.
Its land mass comprises almost one-tenth of the earth's land surface,
an area nearly one and one-half times the size of the United States.'
The coldest of all continents,6 Antarctica is almost entirely covered
by a one- to three-mile layer of fresh-water ice. The ice layer gives it
the highest continental elevation.'
Because its average annual (water equivalent) precipitation
amounts to only a few inches, 8 Antarctica is actually a desert. Its
one river, the Onyx, is just eighteen miles long and flows only during
the summer season. 9 No species of trees or land vertebrates inhabit
the continent. 10
Geologists hypothesize that during the Mesozoic Era (some 100
million years ago), Antarctica, along with Africa, Australia, India,
Madagascar, and South America, was part of the supercontinent
Gondwanaland."' Through continental drift, Antarctica was eventually isolated in its present location. 2 Its closest neighboring continent, South America, now lies over 600 miles away. The nearest
population center, Buenos Aires, is 1,800 miles away. 3
Existing and potential Antarctic resources span the full spectrum.
For example, research scientists have used the desolate continent as4
a standard of comparison for the detection of interplanetary life.'
Antarctica is also the most fertile known source of fallen
meteorites.' 5
Of more pragmatic interest, the continent and its shelf are believed to contain vast deposits of certain minerals, including: chromium; coal; cobalt; copper; diamonds; gold; iron; manganese; nickel;
uranium; and other scarce minerals.'6 There are actual reported oc5.

2 NSF, UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC RESEARCH PROGRAM INFORMATION 1

(Mar. 28, 1985) [hereinafter NSF 2].
6.

WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS

748 (H. Lane ed. 1984). The world's

lowest recorded temperature, minus 128.6 degrees Fahrenheit, occurred at the Soviet
Vostok geomagnetic south pole station in 1983.
7. RAND MCNALLY WORLD ATLAS 229 (15th ed. 1980).

8. NSF 2, supra note 5, at 1.
9. F.AUBURN, ANTARCTIC LAW AND POLITIcs 2 (1982).

10. Id.

11. S. SCHACHTER & C. SCHUYLER, THE ANTARCTIC MINERALS POLICY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1 (Sept. 1984). For an elaboration of this hypothesis, see Craddock,
Antarctic Geology and Gondwanaland, in FROZEN FUTURES 101 (1973).
12. S. SCHACTER & C. SCHUYLER, supra note 11, at 1.
13. F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 1.
14. Id. at 290.
15. Id.
16. See Antarctic Resources: Report on the Meeting of Experts at the Fridtjof
Nansen Institute, reprinted in U.S. Antarctic Policy with Respect to Mineral Exploration and Exploitation in the Antarctic, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and
InternationalEnvironment of the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st
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currences of many of these minerals. 17 The generally accepted explanatory hypothesis is that Antarctica and its continental shelf
share mineral deposits similar to those found in the rest of former
Gondwanaland (which included South Africa and South America).",
The continental shelf may contain tens of billions of barrels of natural gas and oil deposits, a cache roughly on a par with known Iranian oil reserves."l To date, neither the continent nor its shelf have
been commercially exploited, largely because it has not been economically or politically feasible to extract their bounty.
Antarctica's ice is also considered an important potential resource.
The continent contains nearly ninety percent of the world's fresh
water. 20 This resource may be the key to this planet's hydrologic balance in the next century and beyond.
In contrast to the theoretical resources on the continent, resources
living offshore in the Southern Ocean are of known abundance, and
are easily harvestable. The base of the region's ecosystem is krill, a
five-centimeter-long shrimplike crustacean. It is the major food
source for five species of whales, three types of seals, twenty types of
fish, and various bird and cephalopod populations. 2' Krill are so
abundant in the Southern Ocean that some sources estimate that annual sustainable yields equal to or greater than the current total
world marine catch could be harvested each year.22 Even the more
conservative current estimates of a several million ton annual yield
are large in terms of the world's individual fisheries.23 Because of its
high protein content, krill is a valuable potential food source for developing nations. However, despite its potential benefits to mankind,
experts universally recognize that uncontrolled harvesting and depletion of krill could have a devastating and irreparable impact on the
food chain in the Southern Ocean. The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 24 was negotiated and
Sess. 68 (1975); Craddock, Antarctic Geology and Mineral Resources, in A

FRAME-

WORK FOR ASSESSING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS ON POSSIBLE ANTARCTIC MINERAL DE-

VELOPMENT

17.

A-7 (1977).
An occurrence refers to the mere presence of a mineral, in contrast to a de-

posit, which is a potentially commercially exploitable cache. B. MITCHELL, FROZEN
STAKES: THE FUTURE OF ANTARCTIC MINERALS 48 (1983).
18. See supra text accompanying note 11.
19. Mitchell & Kimball, Conflicts Over the Cold Continent, 35 FOREIGN POL'Y
124, 129 (1979).

20. NSF 2, supra note 5, at 1.
21. Mitchell & Kimball, supra note 19, at 128; F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 207.
22. Mitchell, The Politics of Antarctica, 22 ENV'T 12, 13 (1980).

23. Id.
24. See infra notes 129-39 and accompanying text.

came into force in response to that potential devastating environmental impact.

Figure 1: The Antarctic Treaty encompasses ocean and land south of sixty degrees south
latitude (solid line). CCAMLR expands that jurisdiction to the Antarctic convergence
(broken line). Shaded areas represent potential 200-mile exclusive economic zones emanating from Antarctica and islands (over which undisputed sovereignty exist) in and
around the Southern Ocean. Major krill concentrations appear as dots. (Map reprinted
from B. Mitchell and J. Tinker, Antarctica and Its Resources 67 (1980) with permission
of the publisher, Earthscan, and the International Institute for Environment &
Development.)

III.

HISTORICAL BASES OF CLAIMS AND INTERESTS

More than a decade before the inception of the Antarctic Treaty
regime,25 Jessup noted that "a claim with reference to submarine
lands and waters adjacent to the Antarctic continent must find basic
support in the maintenance of a claim to sovereignty over the land
itself." 26 Although territorial claims are frozen under the Antarctic
Treaty regime,27 Jessup's statement highlights the need to analyze
and understand the historical bases of national claims and interests
when assessing the current geopolitical situation in the region. This
section presents an overview of various existing and competing national interests, with particular emphasis on the United States'
interests.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 73-94.
26. Jessup, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 118 (1947).
27. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
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Antarctica was the last continent to be discovered, even though
ancient Greeks had hypothesized its existence.2" Antarctica was not
circumnavigated until 1772. The continent itself was not actually
sighted, by one or more of three explorers (Palmer (United States),
Bransfield (United Kingdom), and Bellingshausen (Soviet Union)),
until 1820.29
Whaling and seal hunting in the Southern Ocean were the central
interests in Antarctica in the nineteenth century. Interest in scientific
research developed at the turn of this century. In 1911, Amundsen
(Norway) became the first person to reach the geographic South
Pole, just ahead of Scott (U.K.).30
Between 1908 and 1940, seven countries laid claims to parts of
Antarctica and adjacent offshore areas: The United Kingdom
(1908), New Zealand (1923), France (1924), Australia (1933), Norway (1939), Chile, and Argentina (1940). 31 Sectors claimed by Argentina, Chile, and the Unitdd Kingdom largely overlap and are disputed.32 Other claimants either recognize or at least do not dispute
each other's territorial claims. 3 The United States vigorously opposes all claims. 4 A large sector, approximately fifteen percent of
the continent, has never been officially claimed by any nation.3 5
Australia, France, and the United Kingdom base their claims primarily on the discovery theory. 6 The underlying assumption of that
theory is Antarctica was and is terra nullius ("territory of no one").
However, inchoate title to land claimed by discovery must, under
international law, be perfected by effective occupation within a reasonable period. 37 Because no claimant nation can be sure that its
28.
29.

NSF 2, supra note 5, at 1.
Id.; see also F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 2.

30. Luard, Who Owns the Antarctic?, 62

FOREIGN AFF. 1175, 1177 (1984).
31. Joyner, The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica, 21 VA. J. INT'L L.
693, 705-07 nn.83-89 (1981) [hereinafter Joyner]; see fig. 1.
32. Mitchell & Kimball, supra note 19, at 125.
33. Triggs, The Antarctic Treaty Regime: A .Workable Compromise or a "Purgatory of Ambiguity"?, 17 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 195, 200 n.21 (1985).
34. Mitchell & Kimball, supra note 19, at 125.
35. Taubenfeld, A Treaty for Antarctic, 531 INT'L CONCILIATION 245, 251
(1961).
36. Id; see also Bernhardt, Sovereignty in Antarctica, 5 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 297,
317 (1975) [hereinafter Bernhardt].
37. See Island of Palmas Case (U.S. v. Neth.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829, 846
(Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928), reprinted in 22 Am. J. INT'L L. 867 (1928). Effective occupation
requires two elements: intent to exercise sovereignty and the actual exercise of sovereignty. J. BRIERLY, THE.LAW OF NATIONS 163 (6th ed. 1963). In the case of uninhabited
land, the requirements for effective occupation may be relaxed to the point that mere
effective administration of the territory suffices. Bernhardt, supra note 36, at 332. The

historical activities or occupation of scientific research stations meets
either the effective occupation or the reasonable period test, alternative bases of territorial claims are invoked to supplement the discovery theory. These include exploration, 8 continuity, 39 contiguity,4" the
sector principle, 4 ' and uti possidetis.42 Even activities conducted pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty, 43 such as scientific research, the exercise of administrative authority, 4 4 and minerals exploration and exploitation,45 may bolster traditional bases for claims, or constitute
new ones.
By 1957, when the International Geophysical Year 46 started, five
other nations-Belgium, Japan, South Africa, the United States,
three cases cited by scholars supporting relaxation of the occupation requirement for
uninhabited lands are Island of Palmas Case, supra; Clipperton Island Case (Fr. v.
Mex.), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 1105 (1932), reprintedin 26 AM. J. INT'L L. 390 (1932);
and Legal Status of Eastern Greenland (Nor. v. Den.), 1933 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 53.
See Bernhardt, supra note 36, at 324; see also F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 12. No

international tribunal or other international organization has ever adjudged the existence
or extent of claimants' territorial sovereignty, if any, in Antarctica.
38. Archdale, Claims to the Antarctic, 1958 Y.B. WORLD AFF. 242.
39. Continuity refers to the inward extension of spheres of influence from coastal
settlements. See J. KIsH, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SPACES 53, 73-74 (1973).
40. Contiguity refers to extension of sovereignty from coastal settlements to surrounding islands. Its application to Antarctica is not recognized under international law,
in part because of the great geographic distance separating South America from Antarctica (see supra text accompanying note 13), and in part, because such application would
entail extending sovereignty from one continent to another continent. Bernhardt, supra
note 36, at 339-42.
41. The sector principle was originally applied to Arctic Ocean claims by Canada
and the USSR. As applied to Antarctica, it would create wedges of sovereign territory
extending longitudinally from claimants' mainland to the South Pole, or from claimed
Antarctic coastal territory to the South Pole. Joyner, supra note 31, at 807 n.95. The
sector principle is not a recognized customary international law principle for Antarctica.
Bernhardt, supra note 36, at 332, 338.

42. Uti possidetisjurisrefers to the rights inherited by South American claimant
nations, Chile and Argentina, from Spain. In this case, inheritance of Antarctica would
be based on the Bull of Pope Alexander the 7th, issued in 1493, in which he divided the
world between Spain and Portugal. Conforti, TerritorialClaims in Antarctica: A Modern Way to Deal with an Old Problem, 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 249, 255 (1986). The

legal consensus is that, while uti possidetisjuris is a valid regional customary international law principle, its extension to Antarctica and the Southern Ocean parallels the
sector principle, making its validity equally suspect. See F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 4950.
43. See infra note 79.
44. Hayashi, The Antarctica Question in the United Nations, 19 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 275, 279 (1986).

45. D. O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 415 (2d ed. 1970). The Antarctic
Treaty consultative parties intend to exercise both legislative and executive jurisdiction
over Antarctic continental and shelf mineral activities. See infra note 158 and accompanying text. For a discussion on the distinction between the two classifications of jurisdiction, see Wolfrum, Compliance with a Minerals Resources Regime, in ANTARCTIC
CHALLENGES 11 181 (1985).

46. For an elaboration of the activities conducted during the International Geo-

physical Year, see Rutford, Summary of Science in Antarctica Prior to and Including
the InternationalGeophysical Year, in ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM, AN ASSESSMENT 87-

101 (1986).
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and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics-claimed historical in-

terest in Antarctica,4 though none made any official territorial
claims nor recognized the antecedent territorial claims of others. It is
particularly noteworthy that the United States has never formally
made an official claim to Antarctic territory, in spite of having the
most extensive history of activity on the continent of all the interested and claimant nations.4
The first documented American activity in Antarctica was a sealing expedition to the South Georgia Islands in 1790.19 After Captain
Palmer's disputed first discovery of the continent in 1820,50 Congress
commissioned a worldwide scientific operation, the Wilkes' United
States Exploring Expedition, headed by Navy Lieutenant Charles
Wilkes, to investigate. 51 Wilkes surveyed and mapped 1,500 miles of
the Antarctic coast (in what later became the Australian Antarctic
52
Territory), and confirmed Antarctica's status as a continent.
An eighty-eight year lull in American activity ensued, until Admiral Richard E. Byrd undertook two unofficial expeditions. These expeditions brought large-scale mechanized exploration to Antarctica
for the first time." The first, between 1928 and 1930, gave rise to

the first flight over the South Pole in 1929. 51 On this expedition,
Byrd surveyed Marie Byrd Land, an area east of 150 degrees west,
overlapping the eastern edge of the Ross Dependency, New Zealand's claim.5 5 He unofficially claimed it for the United States.5 6 He
also established the first American base, Little America, on the Ross
Ice Shelf.57 Byrd's second expedition, from 1933 to 1935, continued
work in Marie Byrd Land.5
After Byrd's private expeditions, Lincoln Ellsworth carried out
two successive operations in 1935 and in 1939, which, although privately undertaken, were sanctioned by the Department of State.5 9
Ellsworth claimed Ellsworth Land, which is adjacent to Marie Byrd
47. Luard, supra note 30, at 1178.
48. F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 61.
49. Id. at 62.
50. Id.; see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
51. 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 353 (2d ed. 1945).
52. Id.
53.
54.

NSF 2, supra note 5, at 1.
F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 62.

55.
56.
57.

id.
Id.
Id.

58.

Id.

59.

Id.

Land and the Antarctic Peninsula, on behalf of the United States.6"
Consistent with established principles of international law, the
United States' official policy was that Antarctica could not be validly
claimed absent effective occupation.61 Therefore, the United States
did not ratify the claims of either Byrd or Ellsworth.
Admiral Byrd led the first official United States expedition to Antarctica in 1939. The purpose of the expedition was to lay the groundwork for an official claim to Antarctic territory. Byrd did so by implanting the American flag and placing written claim flyers in cairns
around Marie Byrd and Ellsworth Lands. 2
Several military exercises took place in Antarctica after World
War II, with the dual purposes of training and strengthening the
basis for a United States claim to Antarctic territory. Operation
Highjump, in 1946 to 1947, was the first of these exercises.63 This
was the largest recorded expedition ever undertaken to Antarctica,
with 4,700 military personnel, eleven members of the press corps,
thirteen ships (including, for the first time, an aircraft carrier and
icebreakers), nineteen planes, and seven helicopters.64 Operation
Highjump's missions included aerial photography of the continent
and airdropping of claims flyers.6 5 In 1947, the U.S. Naval Antarctic
Developments Project, Operation Windmill, again airdropped claims
leaflets and deposited others in cairns. Extensive military training
and equipment testing also took place.66 Even so, the United States
government never officially made any territorial claim in Antarctica.
In 1954 to 1955, in advance of the International Geophysical
Year,67 the United States Navy Antarctic Expedition conducted reconnaissance surveys and established a support base for that project.' The ensuing operation on Ross Island, Deep Freeze I, ran
from 1955 to 1956 and established Antarctica's first permanentlymanned base, Naval Air Facility, McMurdo. It also put in place the
Antarctic Development Squadron Six (VXE-6).69
Antarctica's status as either terra nullius or res communis ("territory of all") remains unresolved. Claimant nations invoke the former
classification as a means of justifying their territorial claims, while
nonclaimant interested nations and the world community at large
60.

P. QUIGG, A POLE APART: THE

EMERGING ISSUE OF ANTARCTICA

127 (1983).

61. Parriott, Territorial Claims in Antarctica: Will the United States Be Left
Out In The Cold?, 22 STAN. J. INT'L. L. 67, 101 (1986) [hereinafter Parriottl.
62. F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 62-63.
63. NSF 2, supra note 5, at 1.

64. F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 62-63.
65.

Id; see also Parriott, supra note 61, at 102.

66. F.

AUBURN,

supra note 9, at 62-63.

67. See supra note 46.
68. HISTORY, NAVAL SUPPORT
inafter NSFA].

69. Id.

FORCE ANTARCTICA OPERATIONS 1

(1986) [here-
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consider the continent to be res communis. As res communis, the
continent would be insulated from national appropriation.70 The status and sovereignty issues regarding Antarctic ice formations are
also unresolved. Of particular interest is the continent's extensive
shelf ice,71 which has terrafirma-like features. Together, the permanent ice shelves and the austral-summer mobile pack ice nearly
double Antarctica's size. This is profoundly significant when establishing baselines for exclusive economic zones under UNCLOS.72
IV.

THE ANTARCTIC TREATY REGIME

For eighteen months during 1957 and 1958, 73 the international
scientific community engaged in the first cooperative venture in Antarctica-the International Geophysical Year. This research project
was a nongovernmental effort, done under the auspices of the International Council of Scientific Unions, 4 and involved scientists from
twelve nations operating sixty-six research stations. 5
The United States Naval Support Force played an extensive and
invaluable role during those experiments. The force flew the first regular flights to and from the continent, established inland research
stations by tractor traverses, and was the first to use cargo planes 76to
airlift supplies to the Amundsen-Scott Station at the South Pole.
At the end of the International Geophysical Year, the Soviet
Union announced that it would maintain its stations and continue
scientific research. President Eisenhower, anticipating an unwanted
extension of the cold war, quickly organized a multilateral conference. The conference included the twelve claimant and historically
interested nations. Its purpose was to arrange multilateral adminis70. It would be a case of first impression if Antarctica were internationally recognized as res or terra communis. Joyner, supra note 31, at 710 n.105. Even if it were so
recognized, it remains unanswered whether nations may freely appropriate its resources,
or, whether those resources are free from national appropriation as the common heritage
of mankind. For an elaboration of the existing positions on the issue, see infra notes 14259, 165, 169 and accompanying text.
71. International legal scholars differ in opinion about the issue of sovereignty
over polar ice formations. See, e.g., D. PHARAND, THE LAW OF THE SEA OF THE ARCTIC
184, 188 (1973); Bernhardt, supra note 36, at 298; F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 32-38.
72. UNCLOS, supra note 2, at arts. 5 (normal baseline), 57 (breadth of the exclusive economic zone). Parriott, supra note 61, at 71; Joyner, supra note 31, at 711.
73. The International Geophysical Year was held from July 1957 through December 1958. See Rutford, supra note 46, at 87.
74. Joyner & Theis, The United States and Antarctica: Rethinking the Interplay
of Law and Interests, 20 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 65, 71 n.31 (1987).
75. Id. at 71.
76. NSFA, supra note 68, at 3.

tration of the region for continuing scientific research activity.7 7 On
December 1, 1959, within six weeks of the convening of the conference, the Antarctic Treaty7 8 was signed by the twelve "original signatory" nations present. 79 The treaty entered into force on June 23,
1961.80

The treaty originally applied only to the continent and ice formations located south of sixty degrees south latitude.81 It declared that
Antarctica would be used only for peaceful purposes.8 2 The treaty
provided for freedom of scientific research83 and cooperation among
the contracting parties in carrying out scientific research, including
the sharing of personnel and research data and findings. It established a kind of tenancy-in-common over the entire treaty area, including cotenants' research facilities. Those facilities are subject to
formal unilateral inspection at any time by any contracting party.85
Consistent with its charter, the Treaty prohibited military operations,8 atomic explosions, 87 and nuclear waste disposal on the continent.88 The Treaty froze the issue of territorial claims, and further
provided that neither new claims nor extensions of existing ones
would be recognized. 89
Although the Treaty established no formal governing structure,
fifteen in camera biennial consultative party meetings have been held
since 1961.90 Over 185 formal recommendations have resulted from
these sessions, on issues ranging from mineral resources to telecom77. Luard, supra note 30, at 1178.
78. Antarctic Treaty, Dec. 1, 1959, 12 U.S.T. 794, T.I.A.S. No. 4780, 402
U.N.T.S. 71 [hereinafter Antarctic Treaty].
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. The treaty region includes "the area south of 60' South Latitude, including
all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the
rights, or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to
the high seas within that area." Id. at art. VI.
82. Id. at art. I.
83. Id. at art. II.
84. Id. at art. Il1.
85. Id. at art. VII.
86. Id. at art. I.
87. Id. at art. V.
88. Id.
89. This article states in pertinent part;
No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial
sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim or enlargement of an existing claim to
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present treaty is
in force.
Id. at art. IV.
90.

POLAR PUBLICATIONS, HANDBOOK OF THE ANTARCTIC TREATY SYSTEM Xvii-

xxii (5th ed. Feb. 1987) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]; OFFICE OF OCEANS AND POLAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE FIFTEENTH ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE MEETING, PARIS, OCTOBER 9-20. 1989 (Nov. 1989) [hereinafter OPA 2].
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munications to tourism.9 1 The majority of the recommendations concern protecting the Antarctic environment and ecosystem.92
These recommendations are the only formal policymaking mechanism of the Antarctic Treaty regime. The Antarctic Treaty regime
administers Antarctic affairs by consensus. For any recommendation
to become binding, it must be unanimously adopted by the consultative parties present at a meeting and formally ratified by the governments of all the consultative parties." To date, over 138 recommendations have been adopted. 4
The fourteenth recent consultative meeting was held in Rio de
Janeiro, from October 5 through 16, 1987.' 5 The significant recommendations adopted in Brazil included establishing a presumption
that consultative meeting documents are public, unless labeled as restricted (reversing prior practice),9 and adopting environmental impact assessment guidelines. The guidelines adopted are consistent
with United Nations Environment Program principles and United
States domestic law. 7 The parties deferred adopting recommendations about: limitations on tourism and nongovernmental expeditions;
the depletion of the ozone layer over Antarctica; and creating an
organizational infrastructure to support the Antarctic Treaty consultative process. 98
The issue of the need for an organizational infrastructure is particularly salient. The Antarctic Treaty regime has thrived over the
past twenty-eight years without a bureaucracy. It has neither a secretariat nor an international headquarters. The United States and
other original signatory consultative parties objected to creating any
such governing structure, partially because of a desire to carry out
scientific research informally, and free of bureaucratic encumbrances.9 9 Additionally, the United States initially wanted neither
Soviet nor United Nations participation in such a governing

structure."' 0
91.
92.
93.
94.

HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at xvii-xxii.

Id.
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 78, at art. XII.
HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at A1-2.

95. OFFICE OF OCEANS AND POLAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE FOURTEENTH ANTARCTIC TREATY CONSULTATIVE MEETING, RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL, OCTO-

BER 5-16, 1987 1 (Dec. 1987) [hereinafter OPA].

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 8.
Id. at 5, 12.
P. QUIGG, supra note 60, at 158.
Joyner & Theis, supra note 74, at 72.

Over time, however, new considerations have developed that militate in favor of creating some kind of infrastructure for the regime.
Since 1959, the number of treaty parties has grown from twelve to
thirty-nine, 101 with more extreme political and socioeconomical divergence than that of any other existing international organization.
Fear of Soviet mischief in Antarctica has proven to be unfounded. In
fact, United States representatives privately acknowledge that their
working relationships with Soviet counterparts in the Antarctic
Treaty regime are excellent. The proposed Antarctic minerals regime will have a secretariat and an infrastructure. 102 That, coupled
with the entry into force of other treaties which are interdependent
with the Antarctic Treaty,"0 3 makes establishing a core infrastructure for the Antarctic Treaty system a necessity. Finally, interest in
Antarctica on the part of the United Nations, 04 other international
organizations, 0 5 states not party to the Antarctic Treaty, 106 nongovernmental organizations, 10 7 and private persons' 08 has increased dramatically since 1959, particularly in the last six years.
At the fourteenth consultative party meeting, the United States
presented a working paper on establishing an infrastructure for the
regime. The paper addressed four areas of concern: 1) financial support for consultative meetings; 2) archives and dissemination of information; 3) relations with external organizations; and 4) financial
administration. 09 While the United States has tempered its opposition to an infrastructure and now recognizes a need for "some type
of small or modest secretariat or office,"" 0 a minority of treaty parties still opposes any sort of infrastructure. This opposition is based
partly on a fear that additional organization "would alter the present
system in [unspecified] unforeseen ways.""' Discussion of the prob101. See infra notes 115-20 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 173-74 and accompanying text.
103.

See infra text accompanying notes 139-41.

104. See infra text accompanying notes 178-83.

105. The following international organizations, among others, have considered issues concerning Antarctica: Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries; Council of Ministers of the League of Arab States; Fifth Islamic Summit Conference of the Organization of the Islamic Conference; and Organization of
African Unity. See G.A. Res. 46, 42 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 97, 98, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/42/46 (1987).
106. For example, Taiwan conducts experimental fishing in the Southern Ocean,
and Saudi Arabia provides financial support for ongoing iceberg towing studies. 16 NSF,
UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC RESEARCH PROGRAM INFORMATION 10 (Sept. 30, 1986)
[hereinafter NSF 16].
107. See infra notes 145, 146, 184 and accompanying text. For an example of
Greenpeace's commitment to environmental issues in Antarctica, see THE GREENPEACE
BoO: OF ANTARCTICA (J. McGay ed. 1988).
108. See infra notes 291-92 and accompanying text.
109. OPA, supra note 95, at 5.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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lem was tabled until the fifteenth consultative meeting.
The increasing cost of hosting consultative party meetings is another concern. Under the current arrangement, consultative parties
volunteer to host meetings and individually bear the full cost. As the
membership in the consultative party structure expands to include
many third world nations, a widening circle of members finds the
financial costs of hosting meetings a strain. Additionally, the lack of
diplomatic relations among several new members prevents them
from hosting meetings. This problem area was similarly raised and
tabled at the fourteenth consultative party meeting." 2

Any United Nations member-nation, or any other nation invited
by all the consultative parties, may accede to the Treaty. However,
only those acceding nations that conduct "substantial scientific research activity in Antarctica, such as the establishment of a scientific station, or the dispatch of a scientific expedition" 113 can achieve
consultative party status, and thus share administrative power with
the original signatory consultative parties. Formal admission of new
consultative parties takes place at special consultative meetings, of
1 4
which there have been nine to date.
Sitting consultative parties have complete discretion in determining what level of activity is sufficiently substantial to merit consultative party status. The thirteen nations that have joined the original
signatories as consultative parties are: Poland (1979); the Federal
Republic of Germany (1981); Brazil (1983); India (1983); The People's Republic of China (1985); Uruguay (1985);11 5 Italy (1987); the
German Democratic Republic (1987);116 Spain(1988); and Sweden
(1988);" Finland (1989); Peru (1989); and the Republic of Korea
(1989).118 Collectively, the thirteen entrants spent hundreds of millions of dollars to achieve consultative party status."19
112. Id. at 5-6.
113.
114.

Antarctic Treaty, supra note 78, at art. IX.
OPA, supra note 95, at 1; Interview with Elizabeth Leighton, Polar Affairs

Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, in Washington, D.C. (Nov. 16, 1989) [hereinafter Leighton
Interview].
115. Joyner, The Antarctic Minerals Negotiating Process, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 888,
889-90 (1987) (listing the first six members).
116. OPA, supra note 95, at 1 (naming Italy and the German Democratic

Republic).
117.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE REPORT OF THE EIGHTH SPECIAL ANTARCTIC TREATY

CONSULTATIVE MEETING 4 (Sept. 22, 1988) (Doc. T-01-Rev. 2)
Sweden) [hereinafter EIGHTH SPECIAL].
118. Leighton Interview, supra note 114; Draft Press Release,
Fifteenth Consultative Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty at I (Oct.
119. See NSF 16, supra note 106, at 1, 3, 5-6, 9; Mitchell &

(naming Spain and
U.S. Dep't of State,
1989).
Kimball, supra note

The fourteen nations that have acceded to the Antarctic Treaty
and not gained consultative party status are: Austria; Bulgaria; Canada; Colombia; Cuba; Czechoslovakia; Democratic People's Republic
of Korea; Denmark; Ecuador; Greece; Hungary; the Netherlands;
Papua New Guinea; and Romania. 120 These nations may attend sessions only if invited by the consultative parties. They have been allowed to attend regularly since 1984.121 These states have no voice in
decisionmaking.
Several acceding, nonconsultative states, namely Peru, the Republic of Korea, Spain, and Sweden, l 2 were expected to seek consultative party status before November 25, 1988, when the minerals regime was opened for signature, in order to ensure their permanent
representation on the governing commission. 123 Spain and Sweden
accelerated their notifications of entitlement to consultative status
and were accorded consultative status on September 21, 1988.124
Peru and the Republic of Korea elected to withhold their notifications until 1989125 and, along with Finland, were accorded consultative status at a special meeting just prior to the Fifteenth Antarctic
Treaty Consultative Meeting.126
Privately, some consultative parties have expressed concern over
the relative ease with which states gain consultative status. Some
parties also perceive a need to establish some threshold level of scientific research activity that must be maintained in order to retain consultative status. This perception derives partly from concern about
the relative stagnation of the programs of two original signatory nations, Belgium and Norway. By virtue of their status as original signatories to the Antarctic Treaty, those two nations enjoy permanent
consultative party status regardless of their level of activity or their
19, at 132. Cf. Borgese, The New InternationalEconomic Order and the Law of the Sea,
14 SAN DIEOO L. REV. 584, 585-86 (1977).
120. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1986, at
211 (1936); OPA, supra note 95, at 1. Canada acceded to the Antarctic Treaty on May
2, 1988. See Diplomatic Note, deposited with U.S. Sec'y of State, May 9, 1988. Columbia acceded on Dec. 29, 1988. See Diplomatic Note, deposited with U.S. Sec'y of State,
Jan. 31, 1989.
121. See HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 1607 (Extract from report of XIIth
ATCM).
122. Interview with Christina Dewey, Economics Officer, U.S. Dep't of State, in
Washington, D.C. (Feb. 19, 1988) [hereinafter Dewey Interview].
123. See infra note 161 and accompanying text.
124. See EIGHTH SPECIAL, supra note 117, at 4. Spain carried out two scientific

expeditions in 1986-87 and 1987-88 and established Base Juan Carlos I, a 12-person
station on Livingston Island. Id. at 3. Sweden established an eight-person station in
Queen Maud Land in January 1988. Id.
125.

Id. at 4; Interview with Raymond Arnaudo and Harlan Cohen, Political Of-

ficers, Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, in Washington, D.C.

(Dec. 7, 1988) [hereinafter Arnaudo Interview].
126. Leighton Interview, supra note 114.

[VOL. 26: 575, 1989]

U.S. Interests in Antarctica
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

maintenance or nonmaintenance of stations. 27
At the fourteenth meeting, the United States proposed the adop-

tion of three guidelines for states seeking consultative party status.
The guidelines are based on past scientific activities, prospective activities, and program management in Antarctica."2" The guidelines
were incorporated into the regime's nonbinding final report.2 9 These
guidelines may have had some bearing on the consultative parties'
decision to defer according consultative status to Ecuador and the
Netherlands in 1989.130

At the fifteenth consultative meeting, held in Paris from October 9
through 20, 1989, action on establishment of an infrastructure for
the Antarctic Treaty regime was again deferred.' 3 ' However,

twenty-one recommendations were adopted, twelve of which concern
intensifying environmental safeguards, including: additional research
on ozone depletion, extension of the Antarctic protected areas sys-

tem, 32 integration of environmental monitoring, and waste
disposal.133
Two recommendations call for special consultative meetings in
1990.'3" One is for a special meeting to address the issue of a comprehensive system for Antarctic and Southern Ocean environmental
protection. This recommendation derives from an Australian and
French proposal to designate Antarctica "a natural reserve/land of
science."' 1 5 According to the United States delegation, this proposal
does not constitute a referendum on the minerals convention. 36
127. See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 78, at art. IX.
128. OPA, supra note 95, at 6.
129. Id.
130. Leighton Interview, supra note 114. (The conclusion that the guidelines
might have had a bearing on the consultative parties' decision to defer according consultative status to these two applicants is the author's and is not attributable to comments
made by Ms. Leighton.)
131. OPA 2, supra note 90, at 1.
132. Id. A new category, "Specially Reserved Areas," was established to expand
environmental protection in specifically protected areas. In addition, a limited number of
combined managed and protected areas will be designated "multiple use planning areas."
Reportedly, one such multiple use area will be Palmer Station. ECO, Oct. 20, 1989, at 3,
col. 1 (issue produced for the XV Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting).
133. OPA 2, supra note 90, at 1.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Id. at 1.
136. Id. The United States delegation views any failure to make timely progress
toward entry into force of the minerals convention as possibly leading to unilateral mining by one or more nations, with potential harm to the Antarctic Treaty system. U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, THE CONVENTION ON THE REGULATION OF ANTARCTIC MINERAL RESOURCE ACTIVITIES: THE UNITED STATES VIEW 2-3 (Oct. 6, 1989).

Another recommendation calls for a separate meeting in 1990 to
discuss the liability protocol 37 of the minerals convention. This
meeting will continue discussions begun during informal consultations on October 5 and 6, 1989, just prior to the fifteenth consultative meetings.1 38 Both special meetings are scheduled to take place in

Chile. 3 "

A.

Management of Living Resources

While the Antarctic Treaty did not address the management of
Antarctic resources, concern for the protection of living resources be-

came the primary focus of the consultative parties soon after the
treaty took effect. Over the years, three significant agreements were
reached regarding the preservation of the Antarctic ecosystem: the

Agreed140 Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and
41
of Antarctic
the Conservation
the Convention
Flora,
and the Convention
on theonConservation
of Antarctic
MarineSeals,1
Living
Resources (CCAMLR).

1

Together with the Antarctic Treaty,

these codicil treaties comprise the Antarctic Treaty System.
CCAMLR is particularly significant because it extends the geographic "jurisdiction" of the Antarctic Treaty System northward to
the Antarctic Convergence.' 3 The primary goals of CCAMLR are
to regulate fishing of depleted finfish stocks and to control the harvesting of krill.'4 Those resources are most heavily concentrated
within 200 nautical miles of the Antarctic continent and around various islands south and north of sixty degrees latitude.145
137. See Minerals Convention, infra note 170, at art. 8(7).
138. OPA 2, supra note 90, at 1-2.
139. Id. at 2.
140. Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, June 213, 1964, 17 U.S.T. 996, T.I.A.S. No. 6058, modified in 24 U.S.T. 1802, T.I.A.S. No.
7692 (1973).
141. Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, June 1, 1972, 29 U.S.T.
441, T.I.A.S. No. 8826.
142. Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, May
20, 1980, 33 U.S.T. 3476, T.I.A.S. No. 10240 (entered into force Apr. 7, 1982) [hereinafter CCAMLR].
143. Id. at art. I. The Antarctic Convergence or Polar Front is the point at which
circumpolar Antarctic cold water meets and falls beneath warmer northern ocean water
currents. See GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, THE FUTURE OF THE ANTARCTIC: BACKGROUND FOR A UN DEBATE 5 (1983) [hereinafter GREENPEACE]. The resultant temperature disparity may adversely affect phytoplankton, the base of the food chain for the
marine world. See Holm-Hansen, EI-Sayed, Franceschini & Cuhel, Primary Production
and the Factors Controlling Phytoplankton Growth in the Southern Ocean 12, 28-31,
42, in ADAPTIONS WITHIN THE ANTARCTIC ECOSYSTEMS: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRD
S.C.A.R. SYMPOSIUM ON ANTARCTIC BIOLOGY XV (1977).
144. The marine resources regulated by CCAMLR include: "fin fish, molluscs,
crustaceans and all other species of living organisms, including birds, found south of the
Antarctic Convergence." CCAMLR, supra note 142, at art. I.
145. See fig. 1. Note that some of the islands, over which national sovereignty is
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From 1978 to 1980, Poland, the Federal Republic of Germany,
the German Democratic Republic, and all Antarctic Treaty consultative parties negotiated CCAMLR. The nongovernmental Scientific
Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) provided technical ad-

vice. " 6 At the final meeting in Canberra, CCAMLR observer status

was conferred on the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 47 CCAMLR observer status was denied to the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, and the European
Economic Community, largely because of Soviet and East European
objections. 48 The negotiating parties also rejected a request by India
and other nations to insulate the Indian Ocean sector from any krill
harvesting activities sanctioned under CCAMLR. 149
CCAMLR perpetuates and broadens the power base of the
Antarctic Treaty consultative parties over Antarctic and Southern
Ocean activities. States acceding to CCAMLR must agree to "acknowledge the special obligations and responsibilities of the
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties for the protection and preservation of the environment of the Antarctic treaty area."' 150 Further,
acceding states are prohibited from asserting or recognizing territorial claims in Antarctica or the Southern Ocean. 5 "
While states that are original signatories to CCAMLR are automatically members of the regulatory commission, only those acceding states which "[engage] in research or harvesting activities in relation to marine living resources,' ' 1 52 to the unanimous satisfaction of
commission members, may join the commission. Membership continues only while they maintain research or harvesting activities. 53
B.

Antarctic Mineral and Hydrocarbon Resources Policy

The issue of resources exploitation did not figure prominently in
Antarctic Treaty negotiations. The purpose of those negotiations was
to quickly formalize some sort of foundational cooperative regime. In
not disputed, potentially have exclusive economic zones that encroach upon the jurisdiction of the proposed minerals regime. See infra note 171 and accompanying text; see
generally Joyner, supra note 31, at 716-17.
146.
147.

See GREENPEACE, supra note 143, at 7, 9-11.
Mitchell, The Southern Ocean in the 1980s, in 3 OCEAN YEARBOOK 371 (E.

Borgese & N. Ginsberg eds. 1982).
148. Id. at 369-70.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 370.
CCAMLR, supra note 142, at art. V.
Id. at art. I.
Id. at art. VII.
Id.

fact, except for an indirect reference in article IX to the consultative
parties' responsibility to protect living resources,"" the treaty fails to
mention Antarctic resources. Perhaps this was because the necessary
technologies for extraction of nonliving resources did not then exist.
Interest in developing nonliving Antarctic resources emerged
within the regime in the early 1970s. That interest was fostered primarily by the United States, which consistently urged that the permissible "peaceful purposes" in article I of the Antarctic Treaty include the right to exploit continental and offshore mineral and other
nonliving resources, so long as strict environmental protections are
observed. 55
South American claimant nations initially opposed the United
States' initiative to consider nonliving resource development. They
feared erosion of the tenuous juridical positions of their own territorial and concomitant offshore claims.' Although somewhat tempered over time, this opposition carried over, even into the recent
minerals regime negotiations.
Japan and Soviet Union also initially opposed minerals and hydrocarbon resource development. Their opposition was based on the perception that existing environmental safeguards were inadequate to
preserve the ecosystem.' 57 As technological, political, and other considerations advanced, their opposition gave way.
The consultative parties first informally discussed the need for regulation of Antarctic minerals activity at the Sixth Consultative
Meeting."5 8 The first recommendation pertaining to minerals came
at the Seventh Consultative Meeting, which urged further study of
the effects of minerals exploration. 59 At the Eighth Consultative
Meeting, the parties agreed to voluntary unilateral restraint while
154. Article IX reads in pertinent part, "Representatives of the Contracting Parties . . . shall meet ... for the purpose of ... formulating ... measures regarding:
... (f) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica." Antarctic
Treaty, supra note 78, at art. IX.
155. In congressional hearings in 1975, Ass't Sec'y of State Ray asserted that:

Throughout the history of our involvement in Antarctica, U.S. policy has consistently held that ... U.S. rights and interests must be protected [including]
...[free access to develop natural resources; and [e]stablish[ment of] uniform and nonpreferential rules applicable to all countries and nations for any

possible development of resources in the future.
U.S. Policy Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and InternationalEnvironment of
the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1975) (statement of
Dixy Lee Ray, Ass't Sec'y of State); see also S. SCHACHTER & C. SCHUYLER, supra note
11, at 30-35.
156. See S. SCHACHTER & C. SCHUYLER, supra note 11, at 7-8.
157. Mitchell, supra note 147, at 379-80.
158. See HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 1601.
159. Recommendation VII-6 (Antarctic Resources - Effects of Minerals Exploration), Seventh ATCM, Wellington, New Zealand, reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note
90, at 1603.
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the regime pursued Antarctic minerals development.160 They also invited SCAR to participate in the development of an Antarctic minerals policy by preparing a preliminary environmental impact assessment. This set the stage for a special preparatory minerals meeting
in Paris in June and July of 1976.161

The report by SCAR concluded that the risks to the Antarctic
environment from minerals exploration and exploitation were not so
great as to completely rule out such activity. 62 This gave impetus to
continued discussions. The principles derived from the Special

(Paris) Preparatory Meeting were adopted at the Ninth Consultative
Meeting. 16' These principles set the stage for all future Antarctic
minerals negotiations, and consolidated policy development responsibility in the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties. The parties also
agreed to urge their nationals, and states who were not party to the
Antarctic Treaty, to refrain from any minerals activity pending implementation of a minerals regime. 6
At the tenth meeting, the parties adopted the recommendation
that the prospective minerals regime govern all aspects of Antarctic
mineral resources activities found acceptable by the regime, including ecological, technical, political, legal, and economic questions. 65
In addition, the regime would be empowered to establish and enforce
rules relating to environmental protection.' By the Eleventh Consultative Meeting in 1981, the parties had a sense of urgency about
the need to conclude a minerals regime.' 7 The goal was to have it in
place before the existence or extent of mineral and hydrocarbon resources became known and before economic or technological considerations made exploitation feasible. The parties also wanted an internally generated minerals regime in place before the United Nations
tried to establish a competing regime. In that vein, the parties estab160. Recommendation VIII-14 (Antarctic Resources - Effects of Minerals Exploration), Eighth ATCM, Oslo, Norway; Extract from report of VIIIth ATCM, reprinted
in HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 1603-05.
161. Recommendation IX-1 (Antarctic Mineral Resources), Ninth ATCM,
London, England (1972), reprintedin HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 1606-07.
162. See HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at Fl-16.
163. Recommendation IX-1 (Antarctic Mineral Resources), para. 4, Ninth
ATCM, London, England (1977), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 1607.
164.

165.

Id. at para. 8.

Recommendation X-1 (Antarctic Mineral Resources), para. 4(iii), Tenth

ATCM, Washington, D.C. (1979), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 1610.
166. Id. at para. 4(iii)(b).
167. See Recommendation XI-1 (Antarctic Mineral Resources), para. 2, Eleventh
ATCM, Buenos Aires, Argentina (1981), reprinted in HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at
1612.

lished four foundational principles that pervaded all subsequent special consultative minerals negotiations:
1) the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties will control the negotiation and implementation of a minerals regime;
2) the entire Antarctic Treaty will be preserved, and in particular,
the provisions of article IV pertaining to territorial claims will not be
affected by any activities undertaken in conformance with the
regime;
3) protection of the Antarctic environment and ecosystem is a fundamental consideration of any proposed action under the regime; and
4) the activities of the regime should be acceptable to all states
which are not Antarctic Treaty consultative parties. Activities should
not otherwise prejudice the interests of all mankind in Antarctica. 168
After this recommendation was adopted, twelve formal special
consultative meetings on minerals resources took place. 6 9 On June 2,
1988, the consultative parties adopted the Convention on the Regu-

lation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities.'
The regime will control the exploration and exploitation of all nonliving, nonrenewable natural resources south of sixty degrees latitude, excluding those in the deep seabed.' 7 ' Any state may become a
party to the convention establishing the regime. However, by doing
so, it acknowledges the supremacy of the Antarctic Treaty system
(i.e., decisions made by the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties),
and agrees to abide by its component treaties, and in particular, by
article IV of the Antarctic Treaty, which freezes the issue of territo168. See id. at 1612-13, paras. 5, 6, which read:
5. The regime should be based on the following principles:
(a) the Consultative Parties should continue to play an active and responsible role in dealing with the question of Antarctic mineral resources;
(b) the Antarctic Treaty must be maintained in its entirety;
(c) protection of the unique Antarctic environment and of its dependent ecosystems should be a basic consideration;
(d) the Consultative Parties, in dealing with the question of mineral resources in Antarctica, should not prejudice the interests of all mankind in
Antarctica;
(e) the provisions of Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty should not be affected by the regime. It should ensure that the principles embodied in Article
IV are safeguards in application to the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty.
6. Any agreement that may be reached on a regime for mineral exploration
and exploitation in Antarctica elaborated by the Consultative Parties should be
acceptable and be without prejudice to those States which have previously
rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica as well as to those
states which neither recognize such rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty
in Antarctica nor, under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty, assert such
rights or claims.
169. Dewey Interview, supra note 122.

170. Convention on the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities, 27
I.L.M. 859 (1988) [hereinafter Minerals Convention].
171. Id. at art. 5(2).
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72

rial claims.'
Both the United States and the Soviet Union are assured of representation on the two decisionmaking bodies of the regime. As
Antarctic Treaty consultative parties antecedent to the regime, they
are automatically members of the policymaking and governing commission.

73

Both nations are also guaranteed membership on the reg-

ulatory committee, which is responsible for operational oversight. 174
Unlike the Antarctic Treaty system, however, most decisionmaking

under the minerals regime will be by majority vote. 175
C.

The United Nations and the Question of Antarctica

After UNCLOS was signed on December 9, 1982,16 the United
Nations began debate on what it termed "the Question of Antarctica.' 1 7 Discussions were prompted by the urgency with which the
Antarctic Treaty consultative parties were moving toward agreement
on a minerals regime. These discussions were initiated by an address
by Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Bin Mohamad, in which he
asserted that Antarctica, having no indigenous population, was the
res of the entire international community. 178
Since that time, each session of the General Assembly has been
marked by Antarctic discussions within the security-related First
Committee,179 submission of annually updated reports by the Secretary General on the Antarctica question, 80 and annual Antarctic
resolutions, approved by the First Committee and adopted by the
General Assembly. 181
172. Id. at art. 10.
173. Id. at art. 18(2)(a), 60.
174. Id. at art. 29(2)(b).
175. Decisions of the commission on "matters of substance" [undefined] will be by
two-thirds majority vote. Id. at art. 22(1). Commission decisions on procedural matters
will simply require a majority vote. Id. at art. 22(3). Commission decisions on budgetary
matters, the principle of nondiscrimination, and areas for development will require a consensus. Id. at art. 22(2). Decisions of the regulatory committee follow a similar scheme,
except that consensus is never required. Id. at art. 32.
176. See UNCLOS, supra note 2.
177. See generally Hayashi, supra note 44, at 275-79, 286-89.
178. See 37 U.N. GAOR (10th plen. mtg.) at 17, U.N. Doc. A/37/PV.10 (1982).
179. See Hayashi, supra note 44, at 277-79.
180. See id.; INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT,
REPORT ON ANTARCTICA 1-3 (July 1987). The latest published report is The Question of

Antarctica: Report of the Secretary General, 43 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 103-04,

U.N. Doc. A/43/564 (1988).
181. See Hayashi, supra note 44, at 279. The most recent resolution adopted by
the 43d General Assembly, consisting of U.N. Resolution A (Doc. A/RES/43/91 1) and
Resolution B (Doc. A/43/91 1), appear in U.N. Press Release GA/7794 (Dec. 7, 1988)

The resolutions, framed in the form of requests to the Antarctic
Treaty consultative parties, have addressed three areas of concern to
the United Nations. One, in 1985, was a general request that the
consultative parties provide information to the United Nations so the
United Nations could act as a central repository for data about Antarctica.1 82 The other two resolutions are ongoing and more substantive. One petitions the consultative parties to invite the Secretary
General or his representative as an observer to general and special
consultative meetings. It also requests that the parties impose a moratorium on minerals negotiations until the entire international community of nations can participate. 83 The other appeals to the consultative parties to take steps to exclude South Africa from participation in consultative meetings.""
D. Status of Activities and Interests in Antarctica
Currently, thirteen nations and one nongovernmental organization,
Greenpeace, operate year-round stations and "winter over" personnel
on the Antarctic continent. 18 5 Several nations, including the United
States, the Soviet Union, Argentina, Australia, Chile, and New Zealand, use their military forces extensively to support their scientific
and research missions.'8 6
The United States has consistently maintained the largest program in Antarctica. It operates three year-round stations: McMurdo
(Naval Air Facility, McMurdo until 1961), the logistics center on
Ross Island; Amundsen-Scott, at the geographic South Pole; and
Palmer, on Anvers Island, off the western coast of the Antarctic Peninsula. 187 The United States also maintains three austral summeronly camps: Siple Station, in Ellsworth Land, at the base of the
Antarctic Peninsula; Byrd Surface Camp, in Marie Byrd Land; and
Marble Point Camp, sixty miles inland from McMurdo.'
The entire United States Antarctic Program (USAP) is administered and funded by the National Science Foundation (NSF), an
independent government agency. Its Division of Polar Programs
[hereinafter 43d Resolution].
182. G.A. Res. 88A, 41 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53) at 99-100, U.N. Doc. A/41/
88A (1986).
183. See 43d Resolution, supra note 181, Resolution A (Doc. A/Res/43/911).
184. See id. Resolution B (Doc. A/43/911).
185. S. NELSON, NARRATIVE FOR THE BRIEFING ON U.S. NAVY ROLE IN U.S.
ANTARCTIC PROGRAM 8A (Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy, Dec. 17, 1987)
[hereinafter NARRATIVE].

186.

Id.

187. S. NELSON, BRIEFING ON U.S. NAVY ROLE IN U.S. ANTARCTIC PROGRAM 9
(Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy, 1987) [hereinafter BRIEFING].
188. Id.
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(DPP) Director is responsible for operational management. 18 9 All
three military services of the Department of Defense (DOD) provide
logistical support. The Department of Transportation (Coast Guard)
plays an important support role, as does NSF's primary civilian contractor, Antarctic Services, Inc. (ANS), a subsidiary of ITT. 90 NSF
may also request support
from other government agencies on a cost19
reimbursable basis.

1

Further support, in the form of airlift support between Christchurch, New Zealand, and McMurdo Station, is provided by the
Royal New Zealand Air Force' 92 under a joint cooperative opera-

tions agreement. 93 Air New Zealand, an independent NSF contractor, performs standard maintenance at Christchurch on the seven
LC-130 aircraft owned by NSF. 94
NSF covers all operation, maintenance, and personnel costs for
military and civilian Antarctica support personnel.' 95 However, the
military billets making up Naval Support Forces Antarctica
(NSFA) and VXE-6 are counted as part of congressionally authorized DOD (year) end-strength. 9 6
In 1987, the United States maintained 1,590 total personnel at its
Antarctic stations. 91 During Operation Deep Freeze 1987, military
and 142 civilian personnel wintered over.' 98
Operational control of DOD military and civilian personnel and
Coast Guardsmen assigned to the USAP rests with Commander,
NSFA (CNSFA). 199 He also has responsibility over criminal juris189.

U.S. Antarctic Program Safety Review Panel Charter (Aug. 14, 1987) [here-

inafter Safety Panel], reprinted in

NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION SAFETY IN ANT-

U.S. ANTARCTIC

PROGRAM'S SAFETY REVIEW PANEL app. 1 at
Al-i (1988).
190. See Memorandum No. 6646, Ronald Reagan (Feb. 5, 1982) (discussing
United States Antarctic Policy & Programs) [hereinafter Memo]. EG & G, Inc., Wellesley, Mass., and Ashland Oil Inc., Ashland, Ky., will provide logistical and operational
support to the NSF under contract, commencing in fiscal year 1991. Wall St. J., Oct. 4,
ARCTICA, REPORT OF THE

1989, at B4, col. 2; Telephone interview with Richard Hayes, Interagency and Polar
Affairs Advisor to the Oceanographer of the Navy, Washington, D.C. (Oct. 11, 1989)
[hereinafter Hayes Interview].
191. NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at I1A, 16A.
192. Id. at 19A.
193. Agreement on Operations in Antarctica, Dec. 24, 1958, United States-New
Zealand, 9 U.S.T. 1502, T.I.A.S. 4151, renewed indefinitely, Oct. 18, 1960, 11 U.S.T.
2205, T.I.A.S. No. 4591 [hereinafter US-NZ].
194. NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 16A.
195. See Memo, supra note 190, at 1.
196. NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 17A.
197. BRIEFING, supra note 187, at 9.
198. Id.
199. NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 11A.

diction for military personnel and DOD contractors. NSF maintains
responsibility for potential criminal jurisdiction over all other
personnel.200
In fiscal year (FY) 1987, the budget for USAP was 117.1 million. 20 ' Of that amount, only $12.5 million directly funded scientific
research; the rest went for operational support. 0 2 CNSFA was allocated $75.8 million for military and related support activities.203
The Soviet Union maintains the second largest Antarctic program.
Like the United States, the Soviet Union has maintained continuous
year-round presence since the International Geophysical Year. It has
seven year-round stations, including one, Vostok, at the geomagnetic
South Pole. It also has six coastal stations, strategically situated in
different sextants of the continent. 20 4 These permanent stations are
augmented by four summer-only research facilities. 0 5 The Soviets
winter over approximately 300 people, and have a summer population of about 425.206

The Soviets maintain air transportation to and from the Soviet
Antarctic base station of Molodezhnaya. Internal air transport is
performed with a variety of aircraft and large helicopters.20 7 The Soviet staging facility in the southern hemisphere is Maputo, the capital of Mozambique. °8
There are forty-one other stations manned by eleven other
Antarctic Treaty consultative parties. 209 The majority of stations occupied by original signatory claimants or historically interested
states are confined to the geographic limits of their respective territorial claims or zones of interest.210

200. Memorandum of Agreement: Department of Defense and National Science
Foundation, Title: Operational and Logistic Support for the U.S. Antarctic Program §
D.l.2.e. (Oct. 3, 1985) [hereinafter MOA]. According to NSF, "[tihe exercise of criminal jurisdiction over any civilian must be consistent with Department of Justice guidance
apllicable to Antarctica." Id. Such guidance, however, is nonexistent. Telephone interview with Judy Olingy, Trial Attorney, General Litigation Division, Department of Justice (Jan. 29, 1988).
201. BRIEFING, supra note 187, at 12.
202. Id.
203. NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 8A.
204. NSF 16, supra note 106, at 11.
205.

Id.

206.
207.
203.
209.
210.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2-13.
See Antarctic Treaty, supra note 78; fig. 2.
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a formal territorial claim. 211 They point to apparently conflicting
policy objectives for resource utilization 212 and extrapolate those into
a general theory of flawed American policy.
The decision to forego making a territorial claim among the preexisting morass of legally questionable claims has .worked only to the
advantage of the United States. That decision facilitated the swift
negotiation and entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty.213 With its
foundational triad of demilitarization, denuclearization, and broad
international cooperation, that Treaty is a paradigm among international agreements.214 Because this treaty was initiated by the United
States, its successful operation greatly enhances the United States'
prestige and influence in the international community.
Because the United States does not officially claim specific parcels
or wedges of territory, its activities and placement of stations is not
restricted. It is free to locate bases of operation strategically, considering a full range of political, economic, military, and other factors.
Claimant states party to the Antarctic Treaty must confine their activities largely to their zones of interest, or risk further dilution of
their already tenuous juridical positions.215 Both the United States
and the Soviet Union have effectively neutralized the entire range of
preexisting territorial claims by their strategic placement of research
stations: the United States at the geographic South Pole, at the point
of covergence of all sector and continuity-based claims; and the Soviet Union, in sextants around the Antarctic coastal circumference. 21 6 In the extremely unlikely event that the Antarctic Treaty
system broke down and territorial claims were revived, activities
within these strategically placed stations would seriously undercut
the legitimacy of prior claims, particularly ones in which little or no
claimant support activity took place.
Former President Reagan reaffirmed the national commitment to
the USAP in an Executive Memorandum dated February 5, 1982.2"1
In the memorandum, the President established national policy objectives of continued effective functioning of the Antarctic Treaty sys-

tem, and of flexibility and operational reach for the USAP un211.

See, e.g., Parriott, supra note 61, at 101; F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 75-78.

212. See, e.g., S. SCHACHTER & C. SCHUYLER, supra note 11, at 37-38, in which
the authors illustrate a 1975 rift in the executive department. The National Security
Council urged a formal moratorium on exploration and exploitation of Antarctic minerals on military and security grounds, but the Departments of the Interior, Treasury, and
Energy favored the United States reserving the unilateral right to exploit minerals. This
resulted in Congress's refusal to enact legislation enjoining United States corporations
from exploring and exploiting Antarctic minerals.
213. Joyner & Theis, supra note 74, at 76.
214. See infra notes 320-21 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
216. See Joyner & Theis, supra note 74, at 77; fig. 2.
217. Memo, supra note 190.
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matched by any other nation.2 18
In 1984, the Director of the State Department's Office of Oceans
and Polar Affairs summarized the United States' national interests
in Antarctica as follows: 1) to ensure compliance with the Antarctic
Treaty's mandate that Antarctica be used exclusively for peaceful
purposes and not become the scene of international discord, and that
freedom of scientific research and cooperation in sharing data be
continued; 2) protecting the Antarctic environment and ecosystems;
3) management of area living resources by the Antarctic Treaty system, and equal access to available resources by United States nationals; 4) nondiscriminatory right of access to the United States where
exploitation of nonliving resources is deemed to be environmentally
acceptable; and 5) preservation of bases for assertion of territorial
claims by the United States.2 19
In addition to the strategic placement of stations, the United
States exerts influence in other ways over parties to the Antarctic
Treaty to ensure they operate within the framework of the treaty.
The interdependence of the New Zealand and United States programs on Ross Island is one example. This relationship, the closest
and most cordial working relationship among any parties to the
Antarctic Treaty, has endured and thrived since 1958.220 It continues
to work smoothly, even in the current political climate that precipitated the suspension of the mutual defense ANZUS Treaty between
the two countries.221
The United States has also participated in virtually every other
party's Antarctic research program, including the Soviet Union's.222
In addition, NSFA personnel have carried out numerous humanitarian rescue and assistance missions, including the recent medical air
evacuation of a South African technician suffering from acute renal
disease at the islolated South African SANAE station, some 4,200
miles across the continent from McMurdo Station.2 23 Because of its
218. Id. at 1-2.
219. See Parriott, supra note 61, at 104 (citing Antarctica: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Science, Technology and Space of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1984) (statement of Rep. Tucker Scully)).
220. See US-NZ, supra note 193; F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 67-71.
221. Security Treaty, Sept. 1, 1951, United States-Australia-New Zealand, 3
U.S.T. 3420, T.I.A.S. No. 2493 (suspended between New Zealand and the United
States), Sept. 17, 1986 (classified joint communique of Aug. 11, 1986, on file at U.S.
Dep't of State).
222. See NSF 16, supra note 106, at 1-13.
223. Aircraft Flies Across Antarctica in Medical Evacuation, NAT'L SCl. FOUND.
NEWS, Nov. 4, 1987, at 1-2 [hereinafter NEWS]. In 1985, the Navy also rescued a burn

superior operational air reach in Antarctica, the United States is the
only country capable of undertaking such missions. 24
The United States exerts political leverage on other Antarctic
Treaty parties by selective use of the treaty's broad unilateral right,
under article VII, to inspect other parties' stations, vessels, aircraft,
equipment, and personnel.225 The United States insisted on inclusion
of this provision in the Antarctic Treaty2 26 and has conducted at
least six inspections under article VII (in 1964, 1967, 1971, 1975,
1980, and 1983), which is more than any other party.227 Argentina,
Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom have also conducted inspections, some jointly with the United States.22 8 No party
has ever objected to the preannounced inspections, and no violation
of the treaty has ever been discovered. 2 9
The exercise of inspections and other rights under the Antarctic
Treaty by the United States and others has had some dampening
effect on the aspirations of South American claimants Chile and Argentina to reassert sovereignty over their pre-Antarctic Treaty sector
claims. Since 1957, Argentina has intermittently strengthened its
military air power in the area.3 ° Since 1977, it has maintained up to
eight families per year at one or more of its six year-round coastal
stations.231
The Chilean plan for consolidating its territorial claim is even
more grandiose. It created a permanent settlement of up to 100 families at its Teniente Marsh Station on King George Island in 1984.
The facility includes support facilities such as schools, telephone, radio, and television service. 2 Teniente Marsh also has a hotel to accommodate tourists visiting Antarctica from the South American
victim at Australia's Davis Station. The victim died en route to McMurdo. NARRATIVE,
supra note 185, at 22C. During Operation Deepfreeze 1988, rescuing a South African
doctor suffering from acute appendicitis was ruled out due to extreme weather conditions
at SANAE. Interview with Richard Hayes, Polar Affairs Advisor to the Oceanographer
of the Navy, in Washington, D.C. (Dec. 7, 1988).
224. See infra text accompanying notes 240-41.
225. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 78, at art. VII. This article also requires states
party to the Treaty to give notice to all other parties of "any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica." Id. at art. VII(5)(c). All mineral
aciivities in Antarctica will be subject to inspections by observers similar to those provided for under Antarctic Treaty art. VII. Minerals Convention, supra note 170, at art.
12.
226. P. QUIoG, supra note 60, at 147.
227. Joyner & Theis, supra note 74, at 81.
228. Id.; Interview with Stewart Nelson, Director of the Interagency and International Affairs Division, Office of the Oceanographer of the Navy, in Washington, D.C.
(Jan. 27, 1988) [hereinafter Nelson Interview].
229. F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 110; see also Boczek, The Soviet Union and the
Antarctic Regime, 78 Am. J. INT'L L. 834, 855 (1984).
230. See Alaimo, Geopolitica aeroantartica,41 AERo-ESPACIO 18-21 (1981).
231. Stars and Stripes, Nov. 25, 1984, at 14.
232. Id.
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mainland.233 In 1983, the Director of the Chilean Antarctic Institute, speaking on behalf of the Pinochet government, publicly rejected the internationalization of Antarctica and asserted Chile's
view of the Antarctic Treaty as merely deferring its sovereign territorial rights.2 4 Both Chile and Argentina make extensive use of military forces to man research facilities. In addition, each has massive
air transport capabilities.23 5
In spite of these symbolic acts, cooperation has been excellent between Chile and Argentina; between Chile and the Soviet Union;
among the coclaimants Chile, Argentina, and the United Kingdom;
and otherwise within the Antarctic Treaty framework.23 6 As an example of the degree of cooperation within the regime, Argentina and
the United Kingdom fully participated and cooperated in the special
minerals consultative meeting in June 1982, during the Falklands/
Malvinas Islands conflict.237 In 1984, the United Kingdom transferred its station on Adelaide Island to Chile.238
The most important way the United States exerts its influence in
Antarctica is through the presence of its military support force. This
force gives the United States the flexibility and superior air operational reach that ensures its preeminence on the continent. Five of
the six United States stations, including the strategically located
South Pole Station, have airfields to accommodate landing by skiequipped aircraft. All six stations have landing facilities for helicopters. 239 The use of ski-equipped aircraft for real life rescue missions
like the air evacuation of the South African technician (from a station without a runway),240 combined with the fueling capabilities of
United States stations remote from McMurdo, demonstrate that
NSFA can respond with personnel and equipment in any part of the
continent with little advance notice.
In addition to search and rescue missions, VXE-6 conducts aerial
photographic mapping, reconnaissance support for the scientific research program, and other transportation missions throughout the
continent.2 4 x Additional air operational support for the USAP comes
233.
234.
1984).

Id.
Classified source (U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, Apr.

235.

NSF 16, supra note 106, at 2, 4.

236.

Id.

237. Id. at 2.
238. Id. at 4.
239. BRIEFING, supra note 187, at 20.
240. See

241.

NEWS, supra note 223.
NARRATIVE, supra note 185,

at llA.

from the Royal New Zealand Air Force z42 and from the United
States Air Force's Military Airlift Command (MAC) .143 MAC normally conducts a mid-winter air supply drop to McMurdo and South
Pole Station as an Air Force training exercise.244
Though the Antarctic Treaty prohibits purely military operations, 245 United States military forces have taken advantage of valuable training opportunities in support of NSF's scientific research
program. Much has been learned about cold weather, high altitude
operations, and the psychological aspects of long-term isolation in
such an environment. In addition, both Navy and Air Force pilots
have benefited from conducting real life air operations under adverse
weather conditions.24 6
The military support force serves the United States' Antarctic interests in several ways: 1) it enhances United States prestige by providing routine and emergency assistance to the Treaty parties; 2) its
size and the scope of the support role provide a mechanism to enforce treaty provisions; and 3) its presence provides important opportunities for training and the observation of allied and rival military
forces.
V.

CURRENT ISSUES WITH MILITARY IMPLICATIONS

A. Domestic Policy Issues
1. How National Policy Is Established
A national policy objective reflects a state's national interest
through political, legal, strategic, military, economic, scientific, and
security considerations. 241 For Antarctica and the Southern Ocean,
this interplay of policy factors is even more complicated, because the
rights of the United States and other nations to assert claims of territorial sovereignty over resources-rich land and sea space are sublimated in favor of a delicate international regime. That regime sub-

sumes provincial short- and mid-term national interests in order to
ensure long-term international harmony and shared nondiscrimina242. Id. at 19A.
243. Id.
244. Id. To further illustrate the great size of the United States' Antarctic air
operations, during Operation Freeze 1987, fixed and rotary wing aircraft belonging to
VXE-6 logged 4,900 flight hours and transported 8.2 million pounds of equipment.
BRIErING, supra note 187, at 18. The Military Airlift Command and the Royal New
Zealand Air Force together moved an additional 1.4 million pounds of cargo. Id. at 19.
245. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 78, at art. I.
246. In Operations Deepfreeze 1988 and 1989, the 109th Tactical Air Group,
Schenectady, N.Y., the only military unit outside the USAP with ski-equipped C-130
aircraft, is supporting NSF activities and getting valuable training under Antarctic conditions, Dear Colleague letter from Peter E. Wilkness, Division Director, Division of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation (Apr. 17, 1987) [hereinafter Letter].
247. Joyner & Theis, supra note 74, at 74.

U.S. Interests in Antarctica

[VOL 26: 575, 1989]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

tory access to the area and its resources.
For the United States, Antarctic policy is set by the interagency
Antarctic Policy Group (APG), which was established in 1965 by
President Johnson. 4s The APG is chaired by the Secretary of State.
Other members include the Secretary of Defense and the Director of
the NSF. 49 Members of other federal agencies with significant interest in the USAP attend on an ad-hoc basis. Responsibilities are
divided roughly as follows: the Department of State makes overall
United States Antarctic policy; the NSF manages and funds the entire USAP and chooses the senior United States representative in
Antarctica; and DOD plans and executes logistical support for the
USAP.2 50 All three agencies delegate their representation at APG
meetings. The Department of State is represented by the Assistant
Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific
Affairs; DOD is represented by the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(International Security Policy) (ASD (ISP)); and the NSF is represented by the Assistant Director for Geosciences.251
The APG rarely meets, usually only biennially or triennially to
review the USAP plan of operation. At the staff level, the working
arm of the APG is the interagency Antarctic Committee. 22
2.

Domestic Problem Areas

In practice, the domestic decisionmaking mechanism has been
plagued with problems. Until recently, turnover of key State Department personnel was too frequent. United States policy was often set
by the DPP at the NSF rather than by the State Department. 53
Interagency squabbles also pose serious problems. For years the
NSF, the agency best suited to do so, has resisted compiling data on
Antarctic continental and offshore nonliving resources. 54
Within DOD, Auburn observed that the Navy grudgingly supports
the USAP, and then only under orders. 55 The problem stems from
the perceived lack of a military mission in Antarctica and a perception on the part of Navy officers that a tour in Antarctica makes
248.
249.

S. SCHACHTER & C.
Id.

250.
251.

Id. at 28.

252.

Id.
S. SCHACHTER & C. SCHUYLER, supra note 11, at 29.
Id.
F. AUBURN, supra note 9, at 77.

253.
254.
255.

BRIEFING,

SCHUYLER,

supra note 11, at 27.

supra note 187, at 13.

them less competitive. 256 There are also significant management
problems that could easily be rectified. For example, the Navy is
primarily responsible for USAP 25 7 coordination (Assistant Secretary
of the Navy (Research, Engineering and Systems) (ASN (RE &
S)),258 and staffing (Oceanographer of the Navy). 25 9 However, the
ASD (ISP), and not a representative of the Navy, represents DOD
on the APG.2 61 Thus, the Navy, which bears key responsibility, has
only indirect input to DOD Antarctic Policy.
The most significant problems involve the interagency relationship
between the Navy and the NSF. Because the NSF funds USAP, it
unilaterally dictates what military and logistics support elements will
be used to carry out the program. This role is beyond the NSF's
competence and should be delegated to the Navy.2 61
Another concern is that the NSF does not always strictly adhere
to the United States Antarctic policy objectives. The agency forum
shops throughout the Navy and the DOD chains of command to obtain approval for its missions, rather than operating through normal
channels.262 For example, in 1987, the NSF bypassed the Navy operational chain of command and went directly to the Secretary of the
Navy to request the diversion of a VXE-6 LC-130 aircraft from
Antarctica to Greenland for an aerial radar survey mission.263
The most acute rift between DOD and the NSF centers on responsibility for safety and security in the area of operations. The Director
of the NSF interprets the 1985 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)

between the NSF and DOD, regarding operational and logistic support for the USAP, 26 4 as vesting sole responsibility for safety in the

NSF.265 This interpretation is bitterly opposed by the Navy, since in
practice, the CNSFA has traditionally been responsible for safety in
256. Id. at n.215 (citing U.S. Antarctic Program, Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Science, Research and Technology of the House Comm. on Science and Technology,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1979) (statement of Mr. Harkin)).
257. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE MEMORANDUM, UNITED STATES ANTARCTIC PROGRAM LOGISTIC SUPPORT (Oct. 16, 1971).
258. Secretary of the Navy Instruction 3160.20B (1983).
259. Id.
260. NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 13A.
261. Id. at 22A. For example, in advance of Operation Deepfreeze 1988, the NSF
unilaterally elected to fund only one Coast Guard icebreaker, instead of the traditional
two. This prompted the Navy to request ASD (ISP) to raise the issue before the APG.
NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 16A. The Navy and Coast Guard also sent a joint letter
of protest to the NSF, requesting that it reverse its decision. MOA, supra note 200.
For a study of United States polar icebreaker requirements, see U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSPORTATION, U.S. COAST GUARD, UNITED STATES POLAR ICEBREAKER REQUIREMENTS
STUDY INTERAGENCY REPORT (July 1984).
262. NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 16A.

263. Id.
264. MOA, supra note 200.
265. Safety Panel, supra note 189, at 1.
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266

Antarctica.
In August of 1987, the NSF established a seven member USAP
Safety Review Panel chaired by the DPP's executive assistant for
safety. 261 The other panel members were a Navy admiral and five
private sector members.268 The panel was to review safety in the
USAP and make nonbinding recommendations to the DPP Director.269 The panel issued its report on June 30, 1988,2170 recommending that top-level responsibility for safety and security be consolidated in the DPP 271 and, in particular, in a newly created Safety,
Environment and Health Officer (SEHO).272 The SEHO oversees
USAP safety and security at the operational level, and reports directly to the DPP Director. 3 One recommendation concerning management in the report advised the NSF to delegate operational authority to CNSFA for those matters within CNSFA's sphere of
support. 4
The safety issues are an example of the blurred or misplaced lines
of authority. The NSF interprets President Reagan's 1982 directive 275 to mean that it, as funder and general manager of the USAP,
must shoulder sole responsibility for all aspects of the program, even
in those areas such as staffing, safety, and security which, in Antarctica, are traditionally areas of military competence.276
The area of safety is one that has grown significantly and will continue to expand as a minerals regime takes effect. The concept of
safety will increasingly come to mean security. In addition to the
growing official contingent in the USAP, 1,590 people in 1986-87,277
tourism and private expeditions 278 are increasing at a staggering
rate. While it is the United States' policy not to offer assistance to
266. Nelson Interview, supra note 228.
267. Safety Panel, supra note 189, at 3.
268. See NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, SAFETY IN ANTARCTICA REPORT OF
U.S. ANTARCTIC PROGRAM SAFETY REVIEW PANEL 1-3, 4 (1988) [hereinafter

THE
REPORT].

269. Safety Panel, supra note 189, at Al-i.
270. See REPORT, supra note 268, at 1-3, 4 (1988).
271. Id. at R-1.
272.

Id. at R-2.

273. Id. at 2-10. Mr. Gary Staffo was appointed SEHO in July 1989. Hayes Interview, supra note 190.
274. REPORT, supra note 268, at R-I.
275. See Memo, supra note 190, at 1.
276.
text.

See supra text accompanying note 266; infra note 293 and accompanying

BRIEFING, supra note 187, at 9.
278. See HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at 1301-05.

277.

private expeditions, the Navy has rendered emergency assistance

with increasing frequency in the recent past.2 7 9 In 1986, over 1,000
tourists came to Palmer Station. 80 Many also visited McMurdo and
other stations. As the scope of activities in Antarctica increases,
these visitors may pose security threats to other interests, such as the

proprietary data of prospectors licensed under the minerals regime, 2 81 or the general safety and security of officials working at research stations.
The activities of Greenpeace and other states' reactions to its activities also pose a security risk to the United States' official personnel and property in Antarctica. Greenpeace occupies a camp at Cape
Evans, on Ross Island, about twenty kilometers from McMurdo Station.282 In February of 1987, members of the Greenpeace Antarctic
expedition demonstrated in front of McMurdo in favor of having
Antarctic declared a world park.283 Greenpeace is adamantly opposed to minerals exploitation in Antarctica.284 Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that its protest activities will increase as activities
under the minerals regime begin.
Although Greenpeace's demonstrations are peaceful, reaction to
their activities by France, the Soviet Union, and others, has often
been violent.285 Greenpeace has voiced it opposition to French con279. Letter, supra note 246, at 3 (citing 1985-86 private expeditions by Ninety
Degrees South, Footsteps of Scott, and Greenpeace); NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 22B
(The Navy assisted Footsteps of Scott after their support ship was crushed by ice.). For
guidelines on the United States' support of private expeditions, see Memorandum, Director, Division of Polar Programs, Subject: U.S. Antarctic Program Guidance in Implementing U.S. Policy on Private Expeditions in Antarctica (Oct. 28, 1987) (private concerns must be self-sufficient; assistance will only be rendered to save human life; rescue
costs are recoverable by the NSF). See also Memorandum, R. LaCount, Senior United
States Representative in Antarctica (Nov. 4, 1987) (access to McMurdo and other U.S.
stations will be considered on a case-by-case basis).
280. Letter, supra note 246, at 3. The record for tourist visits to Antarctica was
set in 1974-75, when approximately 3,750 tourists from seven cruise ships visited the
Antarctic Peninsula, Victoria Land, and Ross Island. HANDBOOK, supra note 90, at
1301. On Jan. 28, 1989, the Bahia Paraiso,an Argentine naval vessel that doubles as a
tourist ship, struck an iceberg near Palmer Station and sunk. Three hundred fourteen
tourists and crew members were rescued unharmed, but Antarctica suffered its first major oil spill. TIME, Feb. 20, 1989, at 77. Members of the USAP assisted in clean-up of
the spill. USA TODAY, Feb. 20, 1989, at 9A, col. 1.
281. Minerals Convention, supra note 170, at art. 37(10).
282. Letter, supra note 246, at 4; Supplement to the United Kingdom Antarctic
Treaty Exchange of Information Under Article VII(5) for 1986-87, Greenpeace
Antarctic Expedition: Environmental Impact Assessment 9 (1987).
283. See AP Photo, Stars and Stripes, Feb. 11, 1987, at 3.
284. See GREENPEACE INTERNATIONAL, AN APPEAL TO THE UNITED NATIONS,
BACKGROUND FOR A SIXTH UN DEBATE 3, 4 (1988).
285. See infra note 290 and accompanying text. In July 1983, the Greenpeace
flagship, Rainbow Warrior, was chased into international waters by two Soviet naval
vessels and nearly captured, after landing seven protestors at Lorino, Siberia. Greenpeace
was protesting suspected Soviet violations of International Whaling Commission recommendations. The seven land-based Greenpeace protestors were released only after United
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struction of a wheeled airstrip near France's Dumont d'Urville base
in Terre Adelie, Antarctica.286 In turn, French resentment of Greenpeace was recently manifested at the October 1987 sixth annual
CCAMLR meeting in Hobart, Tasmania, when France blocked participation by the environmentalist Antarctic and Southern Oceans
Coalition (ASOC), of which Greenpeace is an active member.287
French and subsequent Japanese opposition to ASOC participation
in CCAMLR meetings was lifted at the seventh annual CCAMLR
meeting in November 1988.288 At that meeting, ASOC was invited

to participate as an observer in CCAMLR's Seventh Meeting plenary sessions."'
Greenpeace protestors were forcibly dragged from the runway
construction site at Dumont d'Urville by French construction workers in January of 1989. After that, French officials agreed to give
Greenpeace access to the site and the base. 290 The United States
should also be concerned with Greenpeace's reaction in the unlikely
event that the United States makes the political decison to withdraw
its staging facilities from Christchurch, New Zealand, and exercises
its contingency plan to build a permanent runway at Marble Point
29
Camp. 1
A growing, internal, safety and security threat stems from the
NSF contractors and from other civilian employees and researchers.
With increasing frequency, these employees and contractors are disregarding the safety and security measures established by military
authorities. For example, during Operation Deepfreeze 1986, two
ANS employees ignored Navy regulations posted at McMurdo regarding safe transit routes, fell into a crevasse, and were killed.292 In
States and Canadian government officials intervened. TIME, Aug. 1, 1983, at 17. On July
10, 1985, French intelligence agents bombed the Rainbow Warrier in Auckland harbor,
N.Z., killing a crew member, Fernando Ferrera. TIME, Aug. 19, 1985, at 28. In September 1985, the French government admitted that it had bombed the Rainbow Warrier, in
order to prevent it from protesting French nuclear tests on the atoll Mururoa. TIME, Nov.
18, 1985, at 64.
286. See The Antarctica Project and Greenpeace, International, 9 Antarctica
Briefing, The French Airstrip - A Breach of Antarctica Treaty Rules? 1-9 (July 30,
1986).
287. Department of State Telegram, Subject: Sixth Annual Meeting of CCAMLR
43 (Nov. 13, 1987).
288. See Report of the 7th Meeting of CCAMLR 41, 42 (Nov. 1988).
289. Id.
290. Interview with Raymond Arnaudo, Political Officer, Office of Oceans and Polar Affairs, U.S. Dep't of State, in Washington, D.C. (Apr. 13, 1989); see Antarctic
Airstrip Conflict, 14 GREENPEACE 20 (Mar.-Apr. 1989).
291. NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 22D.
292. Id. at 16B.

1988, the NSF wintered over eighty construction workers to upgrade
berthing facilities at McMurdo. Reportedly, some of them may have
been stationed in Antarctica without the full, predeployment, psychological screening the Navy requires to ensure emotional
and
2 93
tempermental fitness for the rigors of Antarctic isolation.
All of these problems combine to increase the safety and security
risks for the United States' interests in Antarctica, and increase the
potential for heretofore unknown criminal activity on, or near,
United States stations. How, then, will criminal jurisdiction be exercised, if it becomes necessary?
The Antarctic Treaty provides for exclusive national civil and
criminal jurisdiction over scientific personnel, their staffs, and designated observers that conduct inspections under the Antarctic
Treaty. 9 4 For all other personnel, the issue of jurisdiction is left
open to negotiation between affected parties.2 95 For the United

States, there was, until 1984, a jurisdictional void for all nationals
except military personnel, who, under the Uniform Code of Military
Justice, are subject to federal jurisdiction for crimes, wherever com-

mitted. 9 I In 1984, Congress implicitly added Antarctica to the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, by including within such jurisdiction "any place outside the jurisdiction of
any nation with respect to an offense by or against a national of the
United States. 29 7 In effect, this assumes jurisdiction over enumerated felonies committed by United States nationals or by foreign nationals against United States nationals in Antarctica. 9 s This provision also arguably applies to crimes committed on Antarctic ice
formations, although federal courts have applied the special mari293. Nelson Interview, supra note 228. The requirement for psychiatric prescreening derives from DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY MANUAL OF THE MEDICAL DEPARTMENT
ch. 15, paras. 15-37 (Antarctic-"Operation DEEP FREEZE"). The evaluations are extensive. See NAVMED Forms 6520/8 (Antarctic Assignment Questionnaire), 6520/9
(Psychiatric Evaluation), 6520/10 (Psychological Evaluation), and 6520/11 (Combined
Evaluation). At a NSF/NASA-sponsored conference in August of 1987, Justice in the
Antarctic, Space and the Military, Navy psychiatrists largely attributed the lack of
crime in the U.S. Antarctic Program to the extensive psychological prescreening that
personnel undergo before departing for Antarctica. Telephone interview with LTC F.
Kenneth Schwetje, Chief of Space Law, U.S. Air Force Judge Advocate General's Dep't,
Washington, D.C. (Mar. 17, 1988).
294. See Antarctica Treaty, supra note 78, at art. VIII(1).
295. Id. at art. VIII(2) ("[T]he Contracting Parties concerned in any case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult
together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution.").
296. Uniform Code of Military Justice Act, art. 5, 64 Stat. 108, 110 (1950) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 805 (1982)). United States nationals are also subject to
civil and criminal penalties for violations of the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of
Antarctic Fauna and Flora and CCAMLR. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 2407-2408, 2437-2438
(1982).
297. 18 U.S.C.A. § 7(7) (West Supp. 1988).
298. 18 U.S.C. § 7 (1982).
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time and territorial jurisdiction to polar ice formations since 1972.299
The United States joined numerous other Antarctic Treaty consultative parties in extending its criminal jurisdiction to activities in
Antarctica. Argentina, Australia, Chile, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, the German Democratic Republic, India, Japan,
Norway, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and South Africa
have all either specifically enacted legislation governing the exercise
of criminal jurisdiction in Antarctica, or, explicitly or implicitly applied their domestic criminal legislation to Antarctica. 30 0 The question of the primary right of jurisdiction in the event that two or more
states desire to exercise criminal jurisdiction in a given case is still
unresolved.
The final area of domestic concern is the USAP's growing reliance
on foreign-flag vessels to support its scientific missions. True to his
management philosophy, former President Reagan, in his 1982
memorandum,3 01 stressed the need to maximize cost effectiveness in
managing the USAP. To further that objective, he ordered commercial support and management facilities be used where cost-effective
and where their use would not be detrimental to the national
interest. o2
Many of the consultative parties have upgraded their research capabilities in recent years, especially building or chartering ice-breaking research ships.303 The NSF chose to lease a Canadian-flag research ship, R/V Polar Duke, which has been in operation since
1983, at an average annual leasing cost of four million dollars.304
The NSF also intends to use another additional one million dollars
to lease an ice-breaking research ship, which probably will be a foreign-flag vessel. 05 These decisions, combined with the decision to decrease the Coast Guard's ice-breaker support role, run counter to the
primary policy objective: maintaining an active and influential
United States presence in Antarctica. 06 When virtually all of the
299. See United States v. Escamilla, 467 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1972) (homicide committed by civilian contractor on free floating Arctic Ice formation within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.).
300. See Bilder, Control of Criminal Conduct in Antarctica, 52 VA. L. REv. 231,
260-62 (1966).
301. Memo, supra note 190.
302. Id. at 2.
303. NSF 16, supra note 106, at 1.
304. NARRATIVE, supra note 185, at 12A.
305. Id. at 22B.
306. See Memo, supra note 190, at 1 ("The United States Antarctic Program
shall be maintained at a level providing an active and influential presence in Antarctica

United States' ocean research in the Antarctic takes place on foreign-flag vessels, the United States' influence and visible presence is
diminished.
3. Recommendations Regarding Domestic Issues
The Navy should do several things to strengthen its position in
interagency relationships and policymaking. The Secretary of the
Navy should recommend to the Secretary of Defense that the ASN
(RE & S), the DOD logistic coordinator for USAP, represent DOD
on the interagency Antarctic Committee. As the person closest to
actual logistics problems, the ASN (RE & S) is best able to voice
DOD's concerns at this working level forum. Areas of concern include: the level of required Coast Guard support; security and
safety-related issues; and the effect of the decreasing United States'
visibility due to increasing use of foreign-flag charter vessels.
Internally, the Navy must maintain the integrity of its chain of
command to prevent the NSF from forum shopping, within the
chain, for favorable decisions about its missions. Additionally, the
Navy must ensure that Antarctica regulations, particularly those
concerning predeployment screening requirements for the growing
contingent of contractor personnel, are enforced effectively.
Finally, DOD must assert its role as security manager for the
USAP. Negotiations with the NSF should be undertaken within the
Antarctic Committee, the APG, or, if necessary, at the cabinet level,
to formally transfer primary safety and security responsibility to
DOD, and in particular, to the CNSFA. 307 Issues of safety and security fall exactly within the competence and expertise of DOD; and
management of the safety and security program by military support
personnel is the best way to observe and carry out the Antarctic
Treaty. Regardless of the outcome of such negotiations, CNSFA can
rely, not only on his currently delineated sphere of responsibility for
security services, contraband interdiction, and phsycial security inspections set out in the DOD-NSF Memorandum of Agreement, but
designed to support the range of U.S. Antarctic interests.").

307. In response to the NSF's Safety Review Panel recommendations (see supra
notes 271-74 and accompanying text), Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research,
Engineering and Systems directed the Oceanographer of the Navy to empanel a DOD
Antarctic Policy Review Group to reexamine DOD's support role in the USAP. See
Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations, Subject: Antarctic Policy and Support
(Aug. 17, 1988). The NSF, in turn, is currently fighting to guarantee itself access in the
future to all Navy Judge Advocate General incident reports and accident investigations
involving the USAP. See REPORT, supra note 268, at 4-6. The NSF also implies in its
Safety Panel Report that it sees the Navy's responsibility for station management as
gradually shifting to civilian contractors. Id. at 2-14. Because of this ongoing bickering,
the two agencies will probably not be able to resolve their differences and realistically
delineate safety and security responsibility at their own level. This should not deter the
Navy from expeditiously pressing its case at the cabinet level or before the NSC.
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also on his inherent authority as a military commander, 308 to develop
and implement security regulations governing all activities on or
close to United States stations in Antarctica.
Finally, because the United States3 9 now assumes criminal jurisdiction over foreign nationals310 in Antarctica, the United States
Antarctic Treaty delegation should formally present a working paper
to the consultative parties recommending a mechanism for resolution
of criminal jurisdictional controversies. The United States should
propose a model fashioned after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's Status of Forces Agreement (NATO SOFA). 311 That agreement places exclusive, concurrent, and primary jurisdiction based on
such factors as: performance of official duty at the time of an act or
omission; and the relative degree of injury to nationals, property, or
other interests of respective states. 12 The NATO SOFA has worked
well in practice for nearly four decades, and its emphasis on balancing the relative states' interests, should make a similar jurisdictional
model acceptable to all Antarctic Treaty parties.
An Antarctic jurisdictional model would differ from the NATO
SOFA, however, in several key respects. The NATO SOFA primarily involves assertion of jurisdiction over "sending state" military
forces located in "receiving states" or host nations,3 13 while the
Antarctic model would focus on jurisdiction over civilians. In addition, the NATO SOFA is juridically based upon territorial sovereignty, but the Antarctic model must be based exclusively on the
consensus of the Antarctic Treaty parties, and disavow any rights to
308. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 840 (1976) ("There is nothing in the
Constitution that disables a military commander from acting to avert what he perceives
to be a clear danger to the loyalty, discipline, or morale of troops on the base under his
command."); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 893
(1961) (Commanders have a "historically unquestioned power" to exclude civilians from
their installations.).
309. See supra note 297 and accompanying text.
310. The statutory language of 18 U.S.C. § 7(7) does not expressly exclude from
U.S. criminal jurisdiction those foreign nationals immune from U.S. jurisdiction under
art. VIII(1) of the Antarctic Treaty. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
311. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the
Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951 [1953], 4 U.S.T. 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2846, 199
U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter NATO SOFA]; see also Supplementary Agreement to the
NATO Status of Forces Agreement with Respect to Forces Stationed in the Federal
Republic of Germany, Aug. 3, 1959 [1963], 14 U.S.T. 531, T.I.A.S. No. 5351, 481
U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter Supp. Agreement].
312. See NATO SOFA, supra note 311, at art. VII; Supp. Agreement, supra note
311, at art. 19.
313. See NATO SOFA, supra note 311, at art. VII; Supp. Agreement, supra note
311, at art. 19.

territorial sovereignty. 14
The following is a suggested model for assigning criminal jurisdiction in Antarctica. To avoid amending the Antarctic Treaty, any
agreement concerning criminal jurisdiction should leave article
VIII(l) intact. 315 That article provides for exclusive national jurisdiction over contracting parties' scientific personnel, their staffs, and
observers. The agreement should expressly interpret article
VIII(1)316 to cover military personnel supporting scientific missions
in Antarctica. The recommendation presented to the consultative
parties should provide that for all other personnel:
(1) exclusive jurisdiction resides in that injured party to the Antarctic

Treaty for enumerated felony-equivalent offenses, punishable only by its
laws, regardless of the nationality of the offender [Presumably, few or no
offenses would fall into this category.];
(2) concurrent jurisdiction exists for enumerated felony-equivalent offenses
punishable by the laws of two or more Antarctic Treaty parties-states
whose interests are adversely affected.
(a) A state has the primary right of jurisdiction, regardless of the nationality of the offender:
(i) over members of its civilian governmental force, government contract employees, and other official personnel (including personnel operating
under governmental or educational research grants);
(ii) over offenses arising out of an act or omission in the performance
of official duty;
(iii) over offenses solely against the property or security interests of
that state;
(iv) over offenses solely against the person or property of scientific personnel and their staff, military support personnel, member of the civilian
governmental force, governmental contract employees or other official personnel of that state.
(b) The other injured state has the primary right of jurisdiction over all
other offenders. If more than one additional state is involved, the state of
which the offender is a national has primary jurisdiction under this paragraph. 317 The remaining injured states have residual jurisdiction;
(3) For felony offenses not enumerated in the jurisdictional agreement and
for minor (misdemeanor-equivalent) offenses, the state of which the offender is a national has exclusive jurisdiction.
314. To achieve a consensus, any jurisdictional agreement must, as the minerals
regime does, incorporate article IV of the Antarctic Treaty. See supra notes 89, 172 and
accompanying text.
315. See supra note 294 and accompanying text.
316. Article VIII(I) reads:
In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty, and
without prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to
jurisdiction over all other persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph I of Article VII and scientific personnel exchanged under subparagraph l(b)
of Article III of the Treaty, and members of the staffs accompanying any such
persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting Party of which
they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in
Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions.
Antarctic Treaty, supra note 78, at art. VIII(l).
317, States not party to the jurisdictional agreement might successfully argue that assertion of jurisdiction over their nationals by Antarctic Treaty parties violates customary international law. See Bilder, supra note 300, at 276.
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This plan will best serve common interests of justice, where major
felony crimes are involved, by placing primary jurisdiction in the nation in the best position to monitor and bear responsibility for individual actions. Where minor and nonenumerated felony offenses are
involved, the proposed jurisdictional scheme respects the nations'
right of jurisdiction over their nationals, and vests exclusive jurisdiction there.
B. InternationalLegal and PoliticalIssues
All of the international legal and political issues concerning the
status of Antarctica come within the ambit of "accommodation." 318
Accommodation issues, in turn, all fall into one of three categories,
involving relationships with, and within, the Antarctic Treaty
regime.
First, among consultative parties, internal accommodation involves
the reconciliation of the different national interests of the original
signatory parties and the parties which later achieved consultative
party status. It also concerns the relative positions of actual and potential territorial claimant states, states with historical interest, and
the remainder of the consultative parties. Finally, internal accommodation deals with relationships between consultative parties and acceding nonconsultative parties, and relationships between and among
acceding nonconsultative parties to the treaty.
Internal accommodation issues have so far been insignificant for
several reasons. Most importantly, article IV's 319 indefinite suspension of territorial claim issues has reduced the need for competition
among the parties to the Antarctic Treaty, and instead, has encouraged cooperation. No significant activity has yet taken place in
Antarctica that could invite discord, since all activity has been oriented toward scientific research. In addition, as a model for demilitarization, denuclearization, and broad international cooperation, and
with its primary emphasis on protecting the pristine Antarctic environment and its ecosystems, the Antarctic Treaty regime has been
universally lauded by international and nongovernmental organizations, from the United Nations320 to Greenpeace.3 21 The unparalleled
318. As used in this discussion, the term "accommodation" refers to the process by
which a state or group of states reconcile competing national interests in an attempt to
reach consensus with other interested states.
319. See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
320. See UNITED NATIONS DEP'T OF PUBLIC INFORMATION, EVERYONE'S UNITED
NATIONS 169 (10th ed. 1986) ("The 1959 Antarctic Treaty is the first international

efficacious management, by the Antarctic Treaty parties, of a continent and the surrounding ocean space has likewise earned the regime
broad international respect. The incidental benefit of international
prestige has inured to the regime as a whole, and to each member
state which has, in turn, facilitated continued cooperation. Under the
minerals regime, the consultative parties have tried to maintain that
high degree of international respect by ensuring that environmental
protection is the basic consideration in any action taken. 22 Though
the Antarctic Treaty is open to review and possible extinction after
1991,323 the same factors that have so far bound the parties to accord will govern, even as geopolitical tensions in other regions of the
world wax and wane.
The second area of accommodation is "auto-accommodation," the
process by which some Antarctic Treaty parties which had previously embraced the concept of the common heritage of mankind324
reconcile the conflicting viewpoints of common heritage and national
interest. This includes the Group of 77325 in the United Nations and
others who signed UNCLOS.328 Through their actions, within and
without the regime, all thirty-nine treaty parties have shown that
there is no linkage between common heritage principles and the nations' respective positions on Antarctic affairs.327
The third sphere of accommodation, and the most delicate, is external accommodation, or, how the Antarctic Treaty regime interacts
with external entities, and in particular, with the United Nations. A
number of Antarctic Treaty parties, including the United States,
show too little regard for the potential influence of the United Nations over Antarctic affairs and for the potential benefits to the reagreement to provide for the absence of nuclear weapons in a specified area . . . .The
provisions of the Treaty appear to have been scrupulously observed.") [hereinafter EvERYONE'S U.N.].
321. See GREENPEACE, supra note 143, at 6 ("[T]he [Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties] have a reasonably good record of environmental awareness .
.
322. Minerals Convention, supra note 170, at art. 4(2).
323. Antarctic Treaty, supra note 78, at art. XII(2). Any modification or amendment to the treaty after June 23, 1991 will require only majority approval of consultative
parties present at a given meeting. Id. at art. XII(2)(b). Subsequent failure of the parties
to unanimously ratify any such amendment or modification within two years may result

in withdrawal from the treaty by any party. Id. at art. XII(2)(b)-(c).
324. For an account of the development of the principle, see Zuleta, The Law of
the Sea After Montego Bay, 20 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 475, 481-83 (1983); Larschan &
Brennan, The Common Heritageof Mankind Principlein InternationalLaw, 21 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 305 (1983).
325. Established in 1963, the group's membership now exceeds 130. See Friedman
& Williams, The Group of 77 at the United Nations: An Emergent Force in the Law of
the Sea, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 314 (1979); S. SCHACHTER & C. SCHUYLER, supra note
11, at 11-15.
326. See supra note 2. Twenty-four Antarctic Treaty parties are signatories to
UNCLOS. Id.
327. See supra notes 156, 165-68, 183 and accompanying text; infra note 337.
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gime from closer cooperation with the United Nations.
Scholars and commentators have labored over the past quarter

century to classify the status of Antarctica, based on the activities
and actions of the Antarctic Treaty regime.3 28 Whatever theoretical
label one applies to Antarctica under the Antarctic Treaty regime, in
practice, it bears many of the attributes of a United Nations de
facto trusteeship.3 29 To infer, as some have done, that the United
Nations is an impotent influence in Antarctic affairs is a serious mistake. The effects of the recent United Nations' interest in Antarctica
and the Southern Ocean have been felt within and without the

Antarctic Treaty regime.33°
Within the Antarctic Treaty regime, there is significant support
for including the Secretary General as an observer of Antarctic
Treaty meetings.3 3 ' The regime has tempered its former exclusionary

posture by: agreeing to furnish reports of regular consultative meetings to the Secretary General; 332 by reversing its prior position on
confidentiality of documents;33 3 and by acquiescing to the United
Nations' role as a central depository for information on Antarc-

tica. 334 The minerals regime requires its governing commission to cooperate with the United Nations and its specialized agencies.335 Further, it implies that the United Nations will have observer status on
328. See, e.g., Simma, The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providingfor an "Objective Regime", 19 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 189 (1986); Wolfrum, The Use of Antarctic NonLiving Resources: The Search for a Trustee?, in ANTARCTIC CHALLENGE 143 (1983).
329. See U.N. CHARTER art. 76, which reads in pertinent part:
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the purposes
of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall be:
a. to further international peace and security;
b. to promote . . . political, economic, social, and educational advancement
c. to encourage respect for human rights and for the fundamental freedoms
for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion, and to encourage recognition of the interdependence of the peoples of the world; and
d. to ensure equal treatment in social, economic and commercial matters for
all members of the United Nations and their nationals ....
330. See supra notes 105, 177-84; infra notes 331-40 and accompanying text.
331. See Wash. Post, Nov. 19, 1987, at A51, col. 1 ("Malaysian Ambassador
Dato Yusof Hitam and Australian Ambassador Richard Woolcott, who represented the
treaty parties, came close to a compromise that would have resulted in U.N. participation in 'appropriate' treaty meetings. But the effort failed over the issue of whether the
text would have established the principle of internationalization.").
332. See Question of Antarctica: Reports of the Secretary-General, 42 U.N.
GAOR (Agenda Item 70) at 5, U.N. Doc. A/42/586 (1987) [hereinafter SG Report].
333. See OPA, supra note 95, at 5.
334. SG Report, supra note 332, at 5.
335. Minerals Convention, supra note 170, at art. 34(2).

governing and advisory bodies. 336 The minerals regime also sidesteps
confrontation with the United Nations by excluding the deep seabed
from coverage in the administrative management scheme.337
The United Nations has split the otherwise solid3 38 Antarctic
Treaty regime by requesting the suspension of South Africa as a
consultative party. There has always been internal opposition, within
the regime, to full-scale participation by South Africa. This is evidenced by some delegations' refusal to permit South Africa to host a
consultative meeting. 339 As the degree of the worldwide ostracism of
South Africa's government increased, a number of acceding and consultative Antarctic Treaty parties broke ranks to vote in favor of
United Nations General Assembly resolutions urging South Africa's
suspension from consultative status in the Antarctic Treaty regime. 340 The Treaty regime is the last broad international forum in
which South Africa has any voice.
The Antarctic Treaty regime should consider taking some action
against South Africa, even symbolic action, such as collective censure. Any more drastic action, such as suspension of South Africa
336. Id. at art. 34(4).
337. Id. at art. 5(2). The United Nations considers the "seabed and ocean floor
and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction" and any resources there as
"the common heritage of mankind." See UNCLOS, supra note 2, at arts. I(1), 136.
Some consultative parties, including the Soviet Union, proposed during negotiations that
the minerals regime include the deep seabed south of 60* south latitude. Dewey Interview, supra note 122.
338. In U.N. votes on all resolutions, except the South Africa issue, the Antarctic
Treaty consultative parties and all acceding states have either abstained or declined to
participate. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
339. Arnaudo Interview, supra note 125. This point of contention within the
Antarctic Treaty regime is also shown by Australian Ambassador Woolcott's reply to the
42d U.N. General Assembly's resolution, which called on the Antarctic Treaty consultative parties to exclude South Africa from consultative status. He admonished that any
consultative party hosting an Antarctic Treaty consultative meeting must include South
Africa. See 42 U.N. GAOR (Agenda Item 70) at 2, 3, U.N. Doc. A/42/587 (1987).
Woolcott tempered his statement by adding that South African participation would not
have a bearing on "broader foreign policy objectives." Id.
340. In the 41st Session, 13 Antarctic Treaty parties (five of them consultative
parties)-Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, India, Peru, Poland, Romania, and the USSR-voted in favor
of excluding South Africa from Antarctic Treaty consultative status. 41 U.N. GAOR
(96th plen. mtg.) at 36, U.N. Doc. A/41/PV.96 (1986). In the 42d Session, 14 Antarctic
Treaty parties (all of the above nations, plus Ecuador) voted in favor of exclusion of
South Africa from consultative status. Six of the 14 were consultative parties. 42 U.N.
GAOR (85th plen. mtg.) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/42/PV.85 (1987). In the 43d session, only
nine Antarctic Treaty parties-(five consultative parties) Argentina, Brazil, China, the
German Democratic Republic, India, and (four acceding states) Cuba, Ecuador, Peru,
and Romania-voted for exclusion of South Africa from consultative status. 43d Resolution, supra note 181, at 3. Although the number of Antarctic Treaty parties voting
against South Africa decreased in the 43d session, no nation voted against the resolution.
Many, if not most, of the Antarctic Treaty party-states that did not participate in the
vote, strongly oppose South African apartheid, and did not participate for purely political
reasons, unrelated to apartheid.
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from consultative status, carries significant risks for the regime, not
the least of which is establishing the precedent of amending or modifying the status quo. Some form of action, between censure and suspension from consultative status, promises great rewards for the regime by reinforcing the united front, emphasizing the cooperative
paradigm before the world community, and reducing the tensions between the United Nations and the Antarctic Treaty regime.
Additionally, under the minerals regime, the Antarctic Treaty
consultative parties intend to assume quasi-coastal state competency
in defining the extent of their "jurisdiction" over nonliving Antarctic
resources. 341 A gesture of solidarity with the United Nations against
apartheid would dampen United Nations opposition to such a proposal. Such a gesture might prompt the International Seabed Author-

ity of UNCLOS to declare the Antarctic Treaty's regional management of the Southern Ocean to be consistent with UNCLOS. 42
Without the present confrontational environment, there would be little chance the United Nations would try to dismantle an international agreement which epitomizes the highest aspirations of the

United Nations Charter3 13 and reflects them better than do most internal United Nations bodies.

The South African problem threatens the Antarctic Treaty regime
internally as well. This single issue has the potential to destroy the

Antarctic Treaty System.344 Unlike the unparalleled degree of con341. See supra note 171 and accompanying text; cf. UNCLOS, supra note 2, at
arts. 2, 55.

342. Such an interpretation is clearly within the province of UNCLOS. See UN-

CLOS, supra note 2, at arts. 197 (cooperation on a global or regional basis), 237 (obligations under other conventions on the protection and preservation of the marine environ-

ment), 242 (promotion of international cooperation), 311 (relation to other conventions
and international agreements).
343. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, paras. 1-4, which state in pertinent part that the
purposes of the United Nations include:
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace,
and ... to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment of settlement of international
disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;
2. To develop friendly relations among actions based on respect for the principle of equal rights ... and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen
universal peace;
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character ... and;
4. To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of
these common ends.
344. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text. In the 1974 United Nations
General Assembly debate over suspension of South Africa from that body, the Indian

sensus usually achieved within the regime, the South Africa problem
continues to fester and grow. If the consultative parties do not take
action against South Africa, the divisiveness of this issue may spread
into other areas, such as the exploitation of minerals. Without action, domestic and global pressure on various consultative parties will
lead to a call for revising the Antarctic Treaty after 1991. Action of
some sort could stabilize the Antarctic Treaty regime for the next
decade and beyond by eliminating the only contentious issue it faces.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Although the United States has been criticized for not making a
territorial claim in Antarctica, and for what has been labeled a lack
of consistent national policy on Antarctica, it has managed to
orchestrate what is probably the greatest cooperative achievement of
mankind, the Antarctic Treaty System. Under no other arrangement
do nations as politically and culturally diverse as Chile, Cuba, India,
North and South Korea, the Soviet Union, the United States, and
thirty-two others, fully cooperate in management and decisionmaking. Under no other agreement are national interests so subsumed to
the greater good. Also, as the only region on earth that is both demilitarized and denuclearized, Antarctica is a working model for
world peace.
As the establishment of an Antarctic minerals regime nears completion, the United States is in a leadership role in Antarctic polidelegate remarked:
No amount of pressure, influence and persuasion have so far deflected the
white regime from its chosen doctrine of racial supremacy over the blacks, the
browns and the Coloured people. The question now facing us is simply this:
Should we continue to address recommendations to that racist regime which

has remained impervious and indifferent to our resolutions? I suggest that this
is a valid question in the light of our unfortunate experience with past
resolutions.
It is not surprising that in such a situation the majority of the Members of
the United Nations should feel that it is quite hopeless to expect South Africa
to respond positively to our recommendations. What, then are the options open
to us? The expulsion of the white regime in terms of Article 6 of the Charter is
certainly one of the options but, unfortunately, three permanent members of
the Security Council have vetoed such a course of action. We may expect a
similar decision in regard to action to suspend South Africa in terms of Article
5 of the Charter.
29 U.N. GAOR (2281st plen. mtg.) at 31-35 (statement of Mr. Jaipal), U.N. Doc. A/
29/PV.2281 (1974).
From 1970-74, the U.N. General Assembly did not accept South Africa's credentials
to participate in the Assembly's regular sessions. At the 1974 session, the President of
the General Assembly noted that such refusal to accept credentials "is tantamount to
saying in explicit terms that the General Assembly refuses to allow the delegation of
South Africa to participate in its work." EVERYONE'S U.N., supra note 320, at 83. Since
1974, South Africa has been officially excluded from United Nations participation. See
id.; G.A. Res. 3206, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 2, 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/29/
3206 (1974).
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cymaking. To maintain that position, it must remain committed to
preserving and expanding the current governing treaty regime, and it
must be flexible enough to solve the domestic and international
problems confronting that regime.

